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INTRODUCTION 
In October 2015, a Black teenager at Spring Valley High School in 
Columbia, South Carolina had her cell phone out in her math class.1  
Her teacher told her repeatedly to put it away.  Repeatedly she 
refused.  The teacher then called a school administrator, who 
similarly instructed her to put away her phone.  The student 
continued to refuse.  The administrator then called the school 
resource officer (“SRO”), the uniformed, armed deputy sheriff 
assigned to the school.2  The SRO came and informed the student 
that she had to put away her cell phone.3  When the student again 
refused, the officer arrested her for the crime of “disturbing schools.”4  
Other students in the classroom recorded the arrest on their cell 
phones.5  The video footage captured the SRO pulling the teenager 
                                                                                                                                
 1. The incident described here is set forth in detail in Section I.A, infra. 
 2. A federal statute defines an SRO as a “career law enforcement 
officer . . . assigned by the employing police department or agency to work in 
collaboration with schools and community-based organizations . . . .” 34 U.S.C. 
§ 10389(4) (2015).  By a memorandum of agreement between the local school district 
and county sheriff’s department, the latter assigned deputy sheriffs to Spring Valley 
High School. See infra note 96. 
 3. See infra notes 45–57 and accompanying text (describing the events at Spring 
Valley High School in greater detail). 
 4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2010). 
 5. Several news stations published articles reporting on the incident that 
included footage of these recordings. See Sarah Aarthun & Holly Yan, South 
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out of her desk and appearing to throw her across the classroom floor.  
The officer also arrested a second student who encouraged her 
classmates to record the arrest and vocally objected to it.  Students 
posted their videos, which soon went viral.  The incident quickly 
joined a long list of other incidents involving questionable use of force 
by SROs.  It also contributed to the larger debate about policing 
tactics, especially those tactics directed at Black individuals and 
communities. 
The incident initially garnered national attention due to the SRO’s 
use of excessive force. But the Spring Valley High School incident 
also illustrates how specific incidents of relatively minor school 
misbehavior lead to arrest and prosecution rather than school-based 
intervention.6  This incident was a product of a series of choices: by 
educators who asked an SRO to become involved in a classroom 
management situation, and by the SRO who agreed to do so and who 
chose to make two arrests.  These kinds of decisions are replicated in 
a range of cases which have been dubbed the school-to-prison 
pipeline.7  The result—children charged with criminal or delinquent 
acts for school misbehavior—is strongly criticized for imposing an 
overly punitive and harmful law enforcement response on situations 
that would be better handled through school discipline.8 
The decisions that lead to school-based arrests, like those at the 
center of the Spring Valley incident, do not happen in a vacuum.  This 
Article will use that incident and South Carolina’s broader experience 
to analyze the laws, policies, and legal practices that create the legal 
architecture of the school-to-prison pipeline—and also identify 
promising, but incomplete reforms that have taken root in South 
Carolina.  Reforming individual elements of that architecture will 
help limit this problem, but the problem can only be completely 
                                                                                                                                
Carolina Student’s Violent Arrest Caught on Video; Officer Under Investigation, 
CNN (Oct. 27, 2015, 12:50 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/26/us/south-carolina-
spring-valley-high-school-student-video/index.html [https://perma.cc/9VS7-2PGC]; 
Erik Ortiz & Craig Melvin, South Carolina Deputy Ben Fields Fired After Body 
Slamming Student: Sheriff, NBC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2015, 12:34 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/sheriff-announce-south-carolina-deputy-
ben-fields-be-fired-sources-n452881 [https://perma.cc/UW3F-ZRB8]. 
 6. The focus of this Article is on direct examples of the school-to-prison 
pipeline—incidents at school that trigger arrests and/or charges.  Indirect examples, 
in which some combination of severe school discipline, poor education, and excluding 
children from regular schools creates criminogenic circumstances, are outside the 
scope of this Article. 
 7. For a history and critique of the school-to-prison pipeline metaphor, see 
generally Ken McGrew, The Dangers of Pipeline Thinking: How the School-to-
Prison Pipeline Metaphor Squeezes Out Complexity, 66 EDUC. THEORY 341 (2016). 
 8. E.g., infra notes 40–42. 
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solved by reforming all elements.  The legal architecture involves 
several interlocking legal elements that together cause school 
discipline issues to become law enforcement issues. 
First, the Spring Valley incident illustrates how criminal law 
broadly encompasses many incidents at schools that would be better 
handled as school discipline matters than as juvenile delinquency 
matters.  It is a crime in South Carolina to disturb a school “in any 
way.”9  This statute was used to charge both girls in the Spring Valley 
incident—and more than 1300 other South Carolina children that 
same year, making it the second most frequent delinquency charge in 
the state that year.10  The racial disparities for this charge are 
tremendous, even when compared to the already large disparities in 
the juvenile justice system as a whole.11  Although South Carolina’s 
criminal law is particularly broad—perhaps the broadest in the 
nation—other states are not far behind.12 
Second, the Spring Valley incident reveals how legal instruments 
direct SROs’ involvement in situations that school officials should 
handle on their own.  SROs are usually uniformed, armed officers 
employed by local police departments and assigned to schools.13  
There has been a significant national focus on encouraging school 
districts to enter into memoranda of agreement with law enforcement 
agencies to establish shared understandings between schools and law 
enforcement agencies regarding SROs’ roles, and to limit those 
roles.14  The Spring Valley school district had a memorandum of 
agreement with the local sheriff’s department that both placed SROs 
at middle and high schools in the district and required school officials 
to refer any criminal action to those SROs.15  Consistent with the 
memorandum of agreement, the Spring Valley High School 
administrator called in an SRO to assist with a disobedient but non-
violent student.  The Spring Valley experience thus demonstrates the 
importance of creating such memoranda of agreement with provisions 
to prevent school discipline matters from becoming matters for law 
enforcement. 
                                                                                                                                
 9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420(A)(1)(a) (2010). 
 10. See infra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 158–62 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra Section II.A.1. 
 13. A federal statute defines an SRO as a “career law enforcement 
officer . . . assigned by the employing police department or agency to work in 
collaboration with schools and community-based organizations . . . .” 34 U.S.C. § 
10389(4) (2015). 
 14. See infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 204–06 and accompanying text. 
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The Spring Valley experience also demonstrates the need for 
statutory reform.  In addition to the requirements under the 
memorandum of agreement, a South Carolina statute requires schools 
to refer certain other behavior—such as some schoolyard fights—to 
law enforcement.16  That state statute requiring reporting was enacted 
at the height of tough-on-crime reforms of a generation ago.17  This 
statute serves to transform school disciplinary incidents into law 
enforcement incidents unnecessarily.  Like other legislation of that 
era, it is now ripe for reform. 
Third, South Carolina illustrates a problem with the structure of 
diversion programs.18  Diversion programs are often excellent 
alternatives to prosecuting children, but they are too often operated 
by law enforcement, thus requiring law enforcement involvement.19  
Moreover, frequently used programs require a child to first be 
charged so that law enforcement or prosecutors can admit them to the 
program.20  In contrast, many schools do not operate their own 
diversion programs.21  This can lead school officials and police 
officers to charge children criminally with a goal of directing them to 
a law enforcement-operated diversion program.22  Such actions can 
sometimes lead to prosecution and conviction contrary to the intent 
of the school officials or police officers initiating that process.23  More 
broadly, locating diversion programs within law enforcement agencies 
rather than schools requires law enforcement involvement in 
incidents that school officials could handle on their own.  Thus, 
accessing those programs requires transforming school discipline 
matters into law enforcement matters.  Developing more diversion 
programs operated by schools would avoid this unnecessary 
involvement with law enforcement. 
                                                                                                                                
 16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-24-60 (1994). 
 17. 1994 S.C. Acts 299. 
 18. See infra Section II.C.  A diversion program is designed to help the child 
understand his or her error, to prevent its recurrence, and to prevent a prosecution of 
that child—that is, to divert the child from the juvenile justice system.  Some 
diversion decisions are made after a charge is referred to juvenile courts, and others 
(typically involving programs operated outside of law enforcement) are made before 
any charge, thus eliminating the need for a charge. 
 19. See infra Section II.C. 
 20. See GEORGE W. APPENZELLER ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF THE SOUTH 
CAROLINA JUVENILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM 12 (2011), 
http://www.swsolutionsinc.com/Library/Reports/2011_SCDJJ_ArbitrationProgram.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZN4X-5PPT] (describing a commonly used diversion program in 
South Carolina as one for children “charged with committing” certain offenses). 
 21. See infra Section II.C. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
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Fourth, the Spring Valley incident reveals concerns about the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to prosecute, 
dismiss, or divert school-based charges.  In our juvenile justice system, 
such decisions should consider both the state’s ability to prove a child 
guilty of a crime and whether prosecuting a child for that crime is 
necessary to protect the public or to rehabilitate the child.24  Contrary 
to the latter principle, the local elected prosecutor in the Spring 
Valley incident left charges pending against the two girls for months 
before dismissing them.25  The prosecutor wrote that he did not 
believe the publicity around the event would permit him to have a fair 
trial.26  The elected prosecutor did not state any consideration of 
whether prosecution would serve the juvenile justice system’s 
rehabilitative purposes,27 illustrating a more widespread problem of 
how authorities exercise prosecutorial discretion without adequately 
considering whether rehabilitating a particular child requires 
prosecuting him or her.28 
This Article will also address post-Spring Valley reform efforts in 
South Carolina.  These reform efforts are significant, but incomplete.  
There are both local and statewide reforms that seek to limit arrests 
and charges for school misbehavior, and these reforms have had some 
success.  In Richland County (where the Spring Valley incident 
occurred), reforms have reduced arrests by sheriff’s department 
                                                                                                                                
 24. This historic rehabilitative purpose has been stated for decades. See, e.g., 
Wallace Waalkes, Juvenile Court Intake—A Unique and Valuable Tool, 10 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 117 (1964) (quoted in WILLIAM SHERIDAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & 
WELFARE, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS 53 
(1966)). 
 25. See infra notes 72–79 and accompanying text. 
 26. Letter from Dan Johnson, Solicitor, Fifth Judicial Circuit to Captain John 
Bishop, South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (Sept. 2, 2016), regarding South 
Carolina Law Enforcement Division Investigative File No. 32-15-0130, at 11 
[hereinafter Solicitor Investigation Summary], http://www.scsolicitor5.org/Portals/2/
SLED%20Investigative%20Flie%20No%20%2032-15-0130%20-%20Spring%20Valley
%20Matter.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NLJ-9HEX]. 
 27. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM STRUCTURE & PROCESS: 
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF DELINQUENCY SERVICES (2013), 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04205.asp?qaDate=2012 
[https://perma.cc/F28C-JVSG] (analyzing juvenile justice purposes clauses in state 
statutes and finding the vast majority of states endorse rehabilitative goals).  South 
Carolina’s statute endorses rehabilitative goals. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-350(7) 
(2008). 
 28. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Rethinking Family Court Prosecutors: Elected and 
Agency Prosecutors and Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile Delinquency and Child 
Protection Cases, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
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SROs by more than fifty percent, and statewide, changes in practice 
have cut disturbing schools charges in half.29 
The South Carolina Senate has passed a bill dramatically 
narrowing the scope of the disturbing schools offense.30  The bill’s 
fate will depend on South Carolina House of Representatives action 
when it reconvenes in 2018.  Passing this bill would represent 
significant progress, but only partial reform.  An original analysis of 
South Carolina data shows that limiting disturbing schools 
prosecutions has historically led to authorities using other charges 
instead.31  If the pending bill is enacted, it will likely screen out some 
of the more extreme fact patterns, but will not stop the larger flow of 
children through the school-to-prison pipeline.  Recent declines in 
disturbing schools charges have occurred without any enacted 
disturbing schools statutory reforms—showing that powerful levers of 
change exist beyond such legislation. 
This Article will also analyze efforts to improve the legal limits on 
SROs’ activities in schools.  The county in which the Spring Valley 
incident took place has made some significant progress, especially 
through a voluntary agreement between the county sheriff’s 
department and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”).32  This 
agreement identifies a range of minor crimes as school discipline 
matters in which SROs should not be involved.33  Less promising 
efforts to revise the memoranda of agreement between the sheriff’s 
department and local school districts show an ongoing need for 
stronger provisions to distinguish law enforcement from school 
discipline.34  The revised memoranda encourage but do not require 
officers to decline to charge children for minor incidents.35  Yet, the 
revised memoranda continue to require school officials to report to 
SROs any incident that amounts to a crime.36  This is in tension with 
the provisions of the voluntary agreement, and leaves SROs with the 
discretion of what to do next.  Thus, the revised memoranda seek to 
change the culture of SRO involvement in school discipline, but fail 
to change the legal elements that permit it. 
                                                                                                                                
 29. See infra notes 298, and 325–26 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 31. See infra Section III.A.2. 
 32. See infra Section III.B.1.a. 
 33. See infra notes 336–37 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra Section III.B.1.b. 
 35. See infra note 342 and accompanying text. 
 36. See infra note 345 and accompanying text. 
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One statewide reform has made significant progress on limiting the 
role of SROs.  A 2017 South Carolina Department of Education 
regulation limits when school officials can refer minor incidents to law 
enforcement.37  Such referrals are only lawful when an incident poses 
an immediate safety risk or the student has engaged in at least three 
such incidents in that school year.38  It also requires that districts and 
law enforcement agencies incorporate such limits in their memoranda 
of agreement.39  This regulatory change holds the greatest promise for 
statewide reforms for limiting the pipeline.  But the regulation alone 
is not enough because it leaves important implementation questions 
to local school districts. 
Reforms to other pillars of the school-to-prison pipeline’s legal 
architecture remain relatively untouched.  The South Carolina statute 
requiring schools to report many incidents to law enforcement has not 
been changed.  Public schools have not developed a wide set of 
diversion programs.  No formal steps have been taken to affect the 
exercise of delinquency charging discretion. 
This Article does not address several key issues related to the 
school-to-prison pipeline, including points that other scholars have 
already established.  First, it does not rehash the description of the 
school-to-prison pipeline or trace its history.40  Second, this Article 
takes as a given that there is a significant difference between law 
enforcement and school discipline; common school misbehavior like 
disobedience and fights should not trigger arrests or juvenile 
delinquency charges absent relatively severe factors like serious 
injuries, weapon possession, or drug distribution.  Third, United 
States schools, family courts, and juvenile justice systems have too 
often failed to prevent school misbehavior from forming the basis of 
juvenile delinquency charges.  The school-to-prison pipeline 
contributes to this failure and it requires reform.  Other scholars have 
established these points in detail.41  Fourth, this Article does not 
                                                                                                                                
 37. See infra note 356. 
 38. See infra note 357–58. 
 39. See infra note 362. 
 40. For an illustrative summary of the pipeline and its history and growth, see 
Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 919, 929–45 (2016) [hereinafter Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-
Prison Pipeline]; Jason P. Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Tools 
for Change, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313, 324–31 (2016) [hereinafter Nance, Tools for 
Change]. 
 41. E.g., Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 
40, at 929–45; Nance, Tools for Change, supra note 40, at 324–31; Catherine Y. Kim, 
Policing School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 864 (2012). See generally Barbara 
Fedders, The Anti-Pipeline Collaborative, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565 (2016). 
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address non-legal reforms described by other scholars, which can 
establish “more pedagogically sound methods to address school 
violence” than arresting students.42  These include improved training 
and supervision of SROs, classroom management training of teachers, 
school innovations to improve school-wide discipline, and the 
development of a variety of school-based diversion programs—
crucially important topics, but beyond the scope of this Article.  Fifth, 
this Article does not address searches and surveillance of students at 
school and how such actions (and related Fourth Amendment 
doctrines) may further the school-to-prison pipeline.43  Finally, this 
Article does not address how punitive school discipline and academic 
challenges at school can lead to delinquency and adult crime—an 
important component of the school-to-prison pipeline.  Rather, this 
Article focuses on incidents at school that lead directly to arrests or 
charges, and the purely legal reforms necessary to dismantle that 
portion of the school-to-prison pipeline’s architecture. 
Part I will describe the Spring Valley incident in detail, including its 
immediate aftermath and legal reform efforts it inspired.  In so doing, 
Part I will explain why this incident and South Carolina’s broader 
experience is worth focusing on.  Part II identifies the elements of the 
pipeline’s legal architecture illustrated by the Spring Valley incident 
and South Carolina more broadly.  Part III explores reform efforts in 
South Carolina and notes some significant but incomplete progress 
that has occurred.  Part III argues that discrete reforms, while 
positive, will not be enough to stem the flow of cases through the 
pipeline or to keep recent progress from eroding; more 
comprehensive reform is required. 
I.  CASE STUDY: THE SPRING VALLEY INCIDENT AND THE SCHOOL-
TO-PRISON PIPELINE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
This Part will describe the Spring Valley incident itself—both its 
well-publicized facts and other details that are equally important to 
drawing lessons from the incident.  This Part will also explain why this 
incident, and South Carolina’s experience more generally, deserve 
particular attention. 
                                                                                                                                
 42. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 40, at 
978. 
 43. See generally, e.g., Jason P. Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, 
and Implicit Racial Bias, 66 EMORY L.J. 765 (2017); Josh Kagan, Reappraising 
T.L.O.’s ‘Special Needs’ Doctrine in an Era of School-Law Enforcement 
Entanglement, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 291 (2004); Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to 
the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School 
Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067 (2003). 
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A. The October 26, 2015 Spring Valley High School Incident 
The facts of what happened at Spring Valley High School on 
October 26, 2015 are well established.44  A teenager, whose name is 
sealed, had her mobile phone out in her third period algebra I class.45  
Her teacher told her to put away her phone, and she did.46  The 
teacher then assigned the class to do class work on a website.47  He 
used a separate program to monitor what students were doing on 
their individual computers.48  Through that program, he saw that the 
student had opened her email.49  He used his remote access to close 
her email.  She re-opened it and he re-closed it remotely three or four 
more times.50 
The teacher walked up to the student and “noticed that she had her 
cell phone in her lap.  He asked the student to give him her cell 
phone, at which point she refused and told [him] to ‘get out of her 
face.’”51  He then wrote a discipline referral and asked the student to 
leave the class and she refused.52  He repeated the instruction to leave 
and she repeatedly refused.53  At this point, there was no suggestion 
that she was interfering with any other student’s work.54 
The teacher contacted a high school administrator—the equivalent 
of an assistant principal in many schools.  The administrator came to 
the classroom and asked the student several times to leave the 
classroom with him.  “The student sat quietly and refused to comply 
                                                                                                                                
 44. The South Carolina State Law Enforcement Division and the FBI both 
investigated the incident, which was also the subject of significant media attention.  
Except as noted, the summary of facts relies on the official investigations as 
summarized by the elected solicitor based on law enforcement investigations. See 
Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 26. Other accounts abound. E.g., 
ANDREA J. RITCHIE, INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK 
WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR 72–73 (2017); Alan Blinder, Ben Fields, South 
Carolina Deputy, Fired Over Student Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/us/south-carolina-deputy-ben-fields-fired.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2iPRC9e]; Amanda Ripley, How America Outlawed Adolescence, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Nov. 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
2016/11/how-america-outlawed-adolescence/501149/ [https://perma.cc/PQX3-Y7WK]. 
 45. Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 26, at 1. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. 
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with [the administrator’s] directives or respond to him in any way.”55  
The administrator then called the SRO Benjamin Fields and 
explained the situation to that officer when he arrived.56  The 
administrator gave the student a final warning, noting the “deputy is 
here” and asked her to leave a final time; she refused.57 
The SRO asked the student to come with him several times and she 
continued to refuse.  As the elected solicitor (the South Carolina term 
for elected local prosecutor,58 equivalent to the district attorney in 
other jurisdictions) later summarized: “Fields subsequently informed 
the student that she was under arrest for disturbing schools and 
attempted to place her under arrest.  While Fields was attempting to 
effectuate a lawful arrest, an altercation between himself and the 
student occurred.”59  That “altercation” began when Fields used 
physical force to pull the non-compliant student out of her desk.  One 
video showed the student resisting by “striking Deputy Fields in the 
face with her fist when his hand makes the initial contact with her 
arm.”60  The video reveals only this single strike, which was not 
forceful enough to stop or delay the deputy’s actions or cause any 
reported injury.  The deputy successfully pulled the student out of her 
desk, which tipped over and fell to the floor, leaving the student on 
the floor.  He then “threw”61 the student (as the local sheriff later put 
it) several feet away from the desk.  In recordings widely publicized, 
one can hear the officer then say, “[p]ut your hands behind your 
back” as he completed the arrest of the student as classmates looked 
on.62 
After the arrest, authorities took the student to a hospital.  Doctors 
noted several injuries, including “a minor nondisplaced fracture at the 
distal radial physis [a wrist bone].”63 
When the SRO first entered the class, another student, Niya 
Kenny,64 encouraged students to record the incident and objected to 
                                                                                                                                
 55. Id. at 2. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See S.C. CONST. art. V, § 24. 
 59. Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 26, at 2. 
 60. Staff Reports, Richland Co. Sheriff Leon Lott’s Statement on Firing of 
Deputy Ben Fields, THE STATE (Oct. 28, 2015, 4:20 PM), http://www.thestate.com/
news/local/crime/article41712405.html [https://perma.cc/3B42-CWE5]. 
 61. Id. (“The one [action] that concerns me the most was the throwing of the 
student across the floor.”). 
 62. See Aarthun & Yan, supra note 5. 
 63. Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 26, at 9. 
 64. Kenny’s name was made public because she was charged as an adult.  She also 
has spoken frequently about the incident to the media and is the lead plaintiff in the 
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how the SRO handled the situation.  Several other students recorded 
the “altercation” on their mobile phones and circulated the 
recordings, which soon reached media outlets.65  After the SRO 
arrested the first student, Kenny said, “[h]e turned around and he was 
like, ‘Oh, you have so much to say, you’re coming, too.’”66  The SRO 
initially arrested Kenny for disorderly conduct but later submitted 
paperwork to charge her with disturbing schools.67 
The SRO charged both the first student and Kenny with disturbing 
schools.68 
B. The Incident’s Aftermath 
Thanks to the students who recorded the incident and posted those 
recordings on social media, the incident—or at least the final 
moments captured on video—quickly became well known. 
Within two days, the Richland County sheriff fired Deputy Fields.69  
In doing so, the sheriff did not question whether the student with the 
mobile phone had committed a crime or whether Fields should have 
arrested her.  Rather, he focused on the force used during the arrest, 
especially “the throwing of the student across the floor.”70  The sheriff 
also requested an FBI investigation into the incident.71 
Firing Fields did not have any immediate effect on the charges 
Fields filed against either child; both continued to face disturbing 
schools charges.  By December, advocates delivered a petition to the 
office of the Richland County solicitor demanding that he drop the 
charges.72  The solicitor responded with a public statement saying that 
                                                                                                                                
class action challenging the use of the disturbing schools charge. See Complaint at 4, 
Kenny v. Wilson, No. 16 Civ. 2794 (D.S.C. filed Aug. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Kenny v. 
Wilson Complaint], https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/kenny_v_
wilson_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/PU7K-WL3X]. 
 65. See, e.g., WIS Staff, FBI to Lead Investigation of Violent Incident at Spring 
Valley High School, WISTV.COM (Nov. 19, 2015, 3:41 PM), http://www.wistv.com/
story/30353999/video-shows-confrontation-between-spring-valley-student-and-school
-resource-officer [https://perma.cc/9EE4-9753] (posting three videos of the arrest). 
 66. Evie Blad, She Recorded Her Classmate’s Arrest, Then Got Arrested, Too: 
Q&A with Former Student Niya Kenny, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 24, 2017), 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/01/25/sherecorded-her-classmates-arrest-
then-got.html?print=1 [https://perma.cc/TL76-DENU]. 
 67. See Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64, ¶ 86. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Staff Reports, supra note 60. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See WIS Staff, Solicitor: No Involvement in Charges Against Spring Valley 
HS Teens Until FBI Investigation Over, WISTV.COM (Dec. 16, 2015, 7:34 AM), 
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he would decide whether to prosecute the charges “based only on 
evidence and in accordance with the law” and that he would await 
results of the FBI investigation before making a final decision.73  The 
solicitor’s statement made no reference as to whether prosecuting the 
girl who refused to put away cell phone74 (or delaying a decision 
pending the FBI investigation) was in her best interest or served the 
juvenile court’s rehabilitative mission. 
When the FBI concluded its investigation,75 the solicitor 
announced that he would dismiss the charges against the two girls.76  
The solicitor wrote that he believed the first student “did disturb the 
school,” but the termination of the officer and “administrative 
action . . . taken against school personnel” made winning a conviction 
difficult.77  The solicitor again engaged in no analysis of whether 
prosecuting the child served any rehabilitative purpose.78  The 
solicitor concluded that he could not prove that Kenny was guilty of 
disturbing schools.79 
Dismissing the charges was certainly a positive development for the 
two girls (as it would be for any defendant), and research, including 
studies of South Carolina juvenile cases, suggests that this dismissal 
may have reduced the likelihood of either girl engaging in any future 
crime.80  Nonetheless, the dismissal could not erase harms caused by 
                                                                                                                                
http://www.wistv.com/story/30763259/black-parents-association-wants-charges-
against-teens-dropped [https://perma.cc/GVB2-9CYB]. 
 73. Statement of Dan Johnson, Fifth Judicial Circuit Solicitor (Dec. 16, 2015), 
http://www.wistv.com/story/30773582/read-solicitor-johnsons-statement 
[https://perma.cc/U8YT-DYSW]; see also WIS Staff, supra note 72 (describing 
advocates’ efforts and the solicitor’s response). 
 74. Kenny was seventeen years old at the time of the incident and, following 
South Carolina law limiting family court jurisdiction to children under seventeen, was 
charged as an adult. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-20(1) (2008). 
 75. Federal authorities announced they would not charge Deputy Fields with any 
civil rights violations. Cynthia Roldán, Former School Officer Will Not Be Charged, 
Sues Sheriff, School District, THE STATE (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.thestate.com/
news/local/crime/article126379009.html [https://perma.cc/ULD4-W9M9]. 
 76. Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 26, at 11. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Prosecuting rather than dismissing first-time charges was found to increase the 
likelihood of recidivism, with particularly strong results for misdemeanor offenses 
like disturbing schools.  The only exceptions found were for youth “who have [ ] been 
diagnosed with an aggression-related mental disorder,” who had similar levels of re-
offending following a misdemeanor regardless of whether they were prosecuted. 
David E. Barrett & Antonis Katsiyannis, The Clemson Juvenile Delinquency Project: 
Major Findings from a Multi-Agency Study, 26 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 2050, 2051–52 
(2017). 
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the arrests and charges.  Multiple studies have identified that arrests 
and charges—even when ultimately dismissed—increase the odds that 
children will drop out of high school.81  For instance, Gary Sweeten 
found that a “first-time arrest during high school nearly doubles the 
odds of high school dropout.”82  Niya Kenny’s story illustrates this 
harm.  After her arrest at school, Kenny did not return to Spring 
Valley, and instead enrolled in a GED program.83  Later litigation 
brought on her behalf asserted that “due to the humiliation and 
anxiety she experienced, Ms. Kenny did not feel that she could return 
to Spring Valley High School.”84  By her own account, the arrest 
triggered “the worst anxiety,” when police officers, or others who 
reminded her of the incident, came into the fast food restaurant 
where she worked.85  Soon after the event, she stated: “I used to kind 
of, you know, just start crying.  There were times my mom had to 
come pick me up from work because I just, I couldn’t deal with it.”86  
Because the first student was charged in family court and has not 
publicly spoken about the incident, the effect of the incident on her 
and the charges against her are not publicly known. 
                                                                                                                                
 81. Gary Sweeten, Who Will Graduate? Disruption of High School Education by 
Arrest and Court Involvement, 23 JUST. Q. 462, 463 (2006) (noting earlier research 
reaching this conclusion).  Other studies reach similar conclusions. See generally, e.g., 
Paul Hirschfield, Another Way Out: The Impact of Juvenile Arrests on High School 
Dropout, 82 SOC. EDUC. 368 (2009); Randi Hjalmarsson, Criminal Justice 
Involvement and High School Completion, 63 J. URB. ECON. 613 (2008); David S. 
Kirk & Robert J. Sampson, Juvenile Arrest and Collateral Educational Damage in 
the Transition to Adulthood, 86 SOC. EDUC. 36 (2010). 
 82. Sweeten, supra note 81, at 473.  Sweeten found that cases requiring court 
appearances (as must occur when charges are not diverted or dismissed) “nearly 
quadruples the odds of dropout.” Id. 
 83. Scholars and education leaders have argued that “people with GEDs are, in 
fact, no better off than dropouts when it comes to their chances of getting a good 
job.” Claudio Sanchez, In Today’s Economy, How Far Can a GED Take You?, NPR 
(Feb. 18, 2012, 5:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/18/147015513/in-todays-
economy-how-far-can-a-ged-take-you [https://perma.cc/6Z8T-BXSL]; see, e.g., James 
J. Heckman, John Eric Humphries & Nicholas S. Mader, The GED 423, 425 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16064, 2010) (summarizing a body of 
research as showing that “GEDs are not equivalent to ordinary high school 
graduates” and that “[c]ontrolling for their greater scholastic ability, GEDs are 
equivalent to uncredentialed dropouts in terms of their labor market outcomes and 
their general performance in society.”). 
 84. Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64, at 17. 
 85. Blad, supra note 66. 
 86. Id. 
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C. Why Focus on Spring Valley and South Carolina? 
The incident at Spring Valley High School could have occurred in 
any part of the country and, indeed, similar incidents have occurred 
elsewhere.87  The Spring Valley incident “catalyzed a national 
conversation about the involvement of police officers in the 
administration of school discipline.”88  The incident is worthy of 
analysis for that reason alone.  Two additional reasons explain why 
this incident, and South Carolina more broadly, are worthy of a 
particular focus: the incident effectively illustrates the legal 
architecture of the school-to-prison pipeline; and reform efforts that 
followed the incident both illustrate the possibility of effective 
changes and allow for analysis of which reform efforts are most 
impactful. 
1. Spring Valley and South Carolina Illustrate the Pipeline’s Legal 
Architecture 
Multiple legal rules overlap to form the school-to-prison-pipeline’s 
legal architecture.  As Part II will explain in more detail, South 
Carolina cases and data illustrate the role of statutory, judicial, 
regulatory, and contract law in shaping incidents like the arrests at 
Spring Valley.  A focus on statewide trends will capture how the 
pipeline operates in the aggregate, beyond any single incident. 
Relatedly, multiple factors have rendered the school-to-prison 
pipeline particularly active in South Carolina.  According to an 
Education Week analysis of 2013–2014 data, South Carolina ranks 
second in the nation in the percentage of schools with an assigned 
SRO, and eighth in the nation for percentage of students arrested.89  
Prior research indicates that this result should cause no surprise.  For 
                                                                                                                                
 87. See DEREK W. BLACK, ENDING ZERO TOLERANCE: THE CRISIS OF ABSOLUTE 
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 94 (2016) (noting “numerous” stories of “school resource 
officers and officials choking, handcuffing, restraining, and locking up in isolation 
rooms elementary and middle school students, including those with special needs”); 
Evie Blad & Alex Harwin, Black Students More Likely to Be Arrested at School, 
EDUC. WK. (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/01/25/black-
students-more-likely-to-be-arrested.html [https://perma.cc/C874-7X3Z] (listing 
examples in Virginia, Missouri, and Alabama); Jason P. Nance, Rethinking Law 
Enforcement Officers in Schools, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 151, 151 (2016) 
[hereinafter Nance, Rethinking Law Enforcement Officers in Schools] (“Indeed, 
evidence of law enforcement officers mishandling student disciplinary problems 
abound.”). 
 88. Fedders, supra note 41, at 565. 
 89. Policing America’s Schools: An Education Week Analysis: Which Students 
Are Arrested the Most?, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/medias/
ew/19policing/index.html#/overview [https://perma.cc/PP2K-WF2G]. 
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example, Jason Nance empirically studied strict security measures 
including the presence of police officers at schools.90  He concluded 
that the percentage of minority students enrolled at a school predicts 
the use of such security measures, even when controlling for other 
variables such as school and neighborhood crime rates.91  In addition, 
larger schools, urban schools, and southern schools all are more likely 
to have stricter security measures.92  Spring Valley High School fits 
part of the profile for schools where one might expect strict security 
measures and resulting arrests.  Spring Valley’s student population is 
52% Black.93  It is a large school—enrolling more than 2000 
students94—and is located at the edge of Columbia,95 South Carolina’s 
capital city.  By contract between the Richland County School 
District Two and the Richland County Sheriff’s Department, two 
sheriff deputies were assigned to Spring Valley as SROs.96 
Still, Spring Valley is far from alone, and far from the top of the list 
for school arrests.  Spring Valley’s arrest rate of 0.531% is higher than 
the national average, but it still ranks below 127 other South Carolina 
                                                                                                                                
 90. See generally Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1 
(2013) [hereinafter Nance, Students, Security, and Race].  Nance defined “strict 
security measures” this way: “Strict security measures include using metal detectors, 
conducting random sweeps for contraband, hiring law enforcement officers or guards, 
controlling access to school grounds, and installing security cameras.  These 
measures, particularly when used in combination, can create an intense, prison-like 
environment that deteriorates the learning climate.” Id. at 5. 
 91. Id. at 41; see also Evie Blad & Alex Harwin, Black Students More Likely to 
Be Arrested at School, EDUC. WK., (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.edweek.org/
ew/articles/2017/01/25/black-students-more-likely-to-be-arrested.html?print=1 
[https://perma.cc/YE8L-T735] (reporting that Education Week analysis of federal 
data shows “that black students are more likely than students in any other racial or 
ethnic group to attend schools with police”). 
 92. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 90, at 41–42. 
 93. SPRING VALLEY HIGH SCHOOL, 2016–2017 SIC ANNUAL REPORT (2017) 
[hereinafter SPRING VALLEY ANNUAL REPORT], https://www.richland2.org/Richland
District/media/Richland-District/Documents/2017%20School%20Annual%20Report/
High/Spring-Valley-SIC-Brochure-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/V53Y-JQS8]. 
 94. SPRING VALLEY HIGH SCHOOL, 2015 SOUTH CAROLINA STATE REPORT CARD 
(2016) [hereinafter SPRING VALLEY REPORT CARD], http://ed.sc.gov/assets/report
Cards/2015/high/c/h4002069.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG4Q-FSZ3].  Other sources list a 
lower enrollment of 1885 students. See Policing America’s Schools: An Education 
Week Analysis: South Carolina School Data, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 24, 2017) [hereinafter 
South Carolina School Data], https://www.edweek.org/medias/ew/19policing/
index.html#/state/SC [https://perma.cc/U2AZ-N85U]. 
 95. Spring Valley High School is located between U.S. Route 1 and Interstate 20, 
north of Fort Jackson and a 20–25 minute drive from the South Carolina State House 
in downtown Columbia. 
 96. Memorandum of Agreement between Richland County School District Two 
and the Richland County Sheriff’s Department for the 2015–2016 School Year (Mar. 
1, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Richland 2—RCSD 2015–16 MOA]. 
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high schools (there are 1225 total), whose arrest rates range up to 
29.310%.97  Spring Valley also does not fit other stereotypes; it is a 
relatively high-achieving school98 with a diverse student body.99  The 
incident thus demonstrates that the school-to-prison pipeline can exist 
even at a relatively high-achieving school. 
2. Intensive Advocacy in South Carolina for Reform 
South Carolina is also worthy of a case study because of intensive 
advocacy efforts underway within the state, which illustrate both the 
promise and the difficulty of the work required to prevent the 
juvenile justice system from being used to handle school discipline 
matters. 
Reform efforts were beginning even before the Spring Valley High 
School incident.  In the school district in which Spring Valley is 
located, a group of parents formed the Richland Two Black Parents’ 
Association in 2014 and focused on the number of Black students, 
especially Black boys, subject to suspension and expulsion.100  The 
DOJ Office of Justice Programs, Office for Civil Rights began 
reviewing the Richland County SRO program prior to the Spring 
Valley incident.101  This review resulted from “data collected by the 
DOJ and other federal agencies on the county’s juvenile population 
and arrest rates; information on school-based arrests, referrals to law 
enforcement and exclusionary discipline in the county; and concerns 
about the SRO program voiced by Richland County community 
members.”102 
                                                                                                                                
 97. South Carolina School Data, supra note 94 (providing data by percentage of 
arrest and allowing the author of this Article to sort and count the number of schools 
listed above Spring Valley). 
 98. SPRING VALLEY REPORT CARD, supra note 94, at 3 (listing graduation rates 
and end of course test scores which compare favorably to state averages). 
 99. Rather than a segregated school, Spring Valley is a picture of diversity. 
SPRING VALLEY ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 93, at 2 (noting the demographics of 
students and staff as “52% African American, 28% White, 10% Hispanic, 6% Asian, 
4% Other”). 
 100. Carolyn Click, New Richland 2 Parent Group Wants to Discuss Race, THE 
STATE (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.thestate.com/news/local/article13845191.html 
[https://perma.cc/K888-MRVE]. 
 101. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS, 15-OCR-67, LETTER RE: COMPLIANCE REVIEW OF THE RICHLAND COUNTY 
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT 3 (2016) [hereinafter DOJ COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER], 
https://ojp.gov/about/ocr/pdfs/RCSD-SRO-ComplianceReview-08102016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AJK7-XBPZ].  The DOJ letter refers to actions taken before the 
October 2015 incident at Spring Valley High School. See id. (noting site visit by DOJ 
Office of Civil Rights staff in September 2015). 
 102. Id. 
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Reform efforts accelerated after the Spring Valley incident.  The 
General Assembly considered a bill (sponsored by a legislator whose 
district includes Spring Valley High School) to dramatically narrow 
the disturbing schools statute.103  The American Civil Liberties Union 
(“ACLU”) filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin enforcement of the 
disturbing schools and disorderly conduct statutes against students 
attending their schools.104  The South Carolina Department of 
Education convened a Safe Schools Task Force with a goal of 
reviewing policies and regulations that may have contributed to the 
incident or to other less well-publicized problems.105  The Richland 
County Sheriff’s Department entered a voluntary resolution 
agreement with DOJ requiring reforms to its SRO program.106  The 
sheriff’s department and local school districts renegotiated their 
memoranda of agreement to include more provisions to discourage 
arresting and charging students.107 
These reform efforts have made some important progress.  The 
number of disturbing schools charges have dropped by half, and 
particularly strong reductions have occurred in Richland County.108  
A bill to narrow the disturbing school statute passed one house of the 
South Carolina General Assembly.109  The South Carolina 
Department of Education promulgated regulations limiting when 
schools can refer routine school discipline matters to SROs.110  But 
South Carolina’s historical and recent reform efforts also illustrate a 
final point—the need to reform multiple pieces of law.  Because 
multiple pieces of law form the school-to-prison pipeline’s legal 
architecture, reforming only one or two will leave others contributing 
to the pipeline. 
                                                                                                                                
 103. S. 131, 122nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2017), 
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess122_2017-2018/bills/131.htm [https://perma.cc/RP9D-
T94M]. 
 104. Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64.  District Court granted 
defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs have appealed. Id.  The case is 
currently pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See also 
infra notes 270–75 and accompanying text.  In addition, Niya Kenny filed a tort suit 
against the Richland County Sheriff’s Department and the Richland County School 
District 2 seeking damages for false imprisonment, defamation, negligence, and 
negligent hiring and supervision. Kenny v. Richland County Sheriff’s Dept., 2017-CP-
40-05034 (filed Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.scribd.com/document/357039190/Niya-
Kenny-Lawsuit#download [https://perma.cc/3YE9-65BN]. 
 105. See infra note 356. 
 106. DOJ COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER, supra note 101, at 1. 
 107. See discussion infra Section III.B.1. 
 108. Infra notes 298–99 and 324–30 and accompanying text. 
 109. See infra Section III.A.1. 
 110. See infra Section III.B.2. 
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II.  SPRING VALLEY INCIDENT REVEALS THE PIPELINE’S LEGAL 
ARCHITECTURE 
The Spring Valley incident, and the broader practice of charging 
children for misbehavior at school, results from at least four legal 
elements, which form the school-to-prison pipeline’s legal 
architecture. 
The first element is the broad criminal law.111  The charge of 
disturbing schools permits law enforcement authorities to treat a wide 
swath of student behavior as crime.112  This section will analyze the 
disturbing schools statute and its operation in South Carolina, and 
how it illustrates problems with similar statutes in nearly half of all 
states, as well as other broad misdemeanor statutes elsewhere. 
The second element is how SROs’ prominent role in school 
discipline incidents can transform those incidents into criminal or 
delinquency charges.113  Multiple years of research have not 
established whether SROs improve school safety, but they have 
clearly shown that SROs’ presence significantly increases the 
likelihood that students will be arrested and charged with relatively 
minor offenses.114 
It is less clear if the law can effectively cabin SROs’ role.  This 
section will explore the laws and legal instruments governing the 
SRO’s involvement in the Spring Valley incident, and explain how 
those laws permitted, if not encouraged, transforming a school 
disciplinary incident into a criminal justice matter.  At a minimum, 
the Spring Valley incident illustrates the necessity of more effectively 
distinguishing the SRO’s law enforcement role from school discipline, 
and thus keeping SROs out of school discipline matters. 
Third, while many youth-focused diversion programs exist, they are 
largely operated through law enforcement agencies or prosecution 
offices, leading authorities to involve SROs in discipline matters or to 
charge children as a means of accessing such programs.115  The intent 
to use such programs is commendable, but placing them outside of 
schools leads to the unnecessary involvement of law enforcement in 
school discipline matters. 
                                                                                                                                
 111. See infra Section II.A. 
 112. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2010). 
 113. See infra Section II.B. 
 114. Fedders, supra note 41, at 571; Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-
Prison Pipeline, supra note 40, at 948–54. 
 115. See infra Section II.C. 
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Fourth, prosecutorial discretion too often deemphasizes the 
essential determination of whether prosecuting children is necessary 
to protect the public or to rehabilitate children.116  Such a 
consideration was notably absent from the elected prosecutor’s public 
statements about the Spring Valley incident.  Restoring that 
consideration would help limit charges and prosecutions of incidents 
that schools can handle better than courts. 
A. Wide Criminal Law: Disturbing Schools Statutes and Their 
Disparate Impact 
1. Statutory Terms Criminalizing Ordinary School Misbehavior 
The breadth of South Carolina’s criminal law was an essential legal 
piece that transformed a student’s non-violent non-compliance with a 
teacher into two criminal charges.  The SRO arrested the two girls for 
the crime of disturbing schools.  Specifically, in South Carolina, it is a 
crime “for any person willfully or unnecessarily (a) to interfere with 
or to disturb in any way or in any place the students or teachers of any 
school or college in this State, (b) to loiter about such school or 
college premises or (c) to act in an obnoxious manner thereon.”117  
The law is incredibly broad—disturbing a school “in any way” is a 
crime,118 so it is easy to see how school officials or the officer 
concluded that the child who refused to put away her cell phone or 
leave the classroom at her teacher’s instruction had committed a 
crime.  Following a detailed investigation, the local elected prosecutor 
concluded that the first student did disturb the school.119  But even 
the prosecutor concluded that Niya Kenny’s conduct—objecting to 
the officer’s conduct—did not rise to a crime.120  Authorities have 
used this charge with great frequency—1324 disturbing schools 
charges were sent to South Carolina family courts in 2015–2016, 
making it the second most frequent delinquency charge.121  Several 
hundred more individuals ages seventeen and older were charged 
with disturbing schools as adults.122 
                                                                                                                                
 116. See infra Section II.D. 
 117. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2010). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 26, at 11. 
 120. Id. 
 121. S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2015–2016, at 
13 (2016) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2015–2016], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2015-1
6%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT3J-DWZW]. 
 122. Under current law, juvenile court jurisdiction ends at seventeen, which is set 
to change to eighteen in 2019. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-20(1) (2008) (defining child 
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South Carolina’s statute is one of many.  At least twenty other 
states have some kind of statute criminalizing misbehavior at 
school,123 many of which prosecute similarly large numbers of 
children under their statutes.124  The Atlantic concluded that more 
than 10,000 disturbing schools charges are filed nationally each 
year.125  Beyond state statutes, many municipalities also outlaw 
disturbing schools.126 
Many jurisdictions with disturbing schools statutes have had 
officers arrest students under disturbing schools statutes for non-
violent conduct that would be more appropriately treated as school 
discipline than as delinquency matters.  In New Mexico, for instance, 
a seventh grade student was arrested for “interfere[nce] with the 
educational process” for a series of burps.127  As the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit later summarized the alleged crime, the 
child “had generated several fake burps” in gym class, “which made 
                                                                                                                                
under current law as under seventeen); 2016 S.C. Acts 1751 (redefining child as under 
eighteen).  Statistics for seventeen-year-olds (and older individuals) charged with 
disturbing schools are difficult to find because those charges are filed in local 
summary courts and no statewide data is tracked.  When the South Carolina Revenue 
and Fiscal Affairs Office estimated the impact of a bill to narrow the disturbing 
schools statute (discussed in Section III.A.1), it reported 132 convictions for 
disturbing schools in 2015–2016. S.C. REVENUE & FISCAL AFFAIRS OFFICE, 
STATEMENT OF ESTIMATED FISCAL IMPACT S. 0131, at 2 (2017), http://rfa.sc.gov/files/
impact/S0131%202017-01-10%20Introduced.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2W6-JEYS].  That 
figure only includes results from twenty-seven percent of magistrate’s courts, and 
only includes prosecutions, excluding cases that were dismissed or diverted. Id.  The 
total number of disturbing schools charges filed against those seventeen and older is, 
therefore, likely to be several hundred. 
 123. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2911 (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-21-606 
(West 2005); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 32210 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-
109 (West 2005); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 14, § 4110 (West 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 871.01 (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6804 (2001); MD. CODE ANN., 
EDUC. § 26-101 (West 1978); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-23 (West 1970); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 20-1-206 (West 1947); NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 392.180 & 392.910(2) (2016); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:11 (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-13 (West 1970); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-288.4(a)(6) (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 15.1-06-16 
(West 1999); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-11-1 (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 13-32-6 (2017); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.635.030 (West 2017); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 61-6-14 (West 2017). 
 124. Ripley, supra note 44 (reporting similarly large numbers in Maryland, Florida, 
Kentucky, and North Carolina). 
 125. Id. 
 126. E.g., SELMA ALA., CODE ORDINANCES § 17-33 (2017). 
 127. A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1139 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
2151 (2017).  This case upheld dismissal of the lawsuit for unlawful arrest against the 
officer, and is notable in part because it featured a stinging dissent by then-Judge Neil 
Gorsuch. See id. at 1169–70 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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the other students laugh and hampered class proceedings.”128  The 
teacher then told the child to sit in the hallway, but “he leaned into 
the classroom entranceway and continued to burp and laugh.”129  The 
teacher called the SRO, who arrested the child.130  In another New 
Mexico case, an SRO arrested a fourteen-year-old for texting in class 
and refusing to turn over her cell phone.131  In Texas, children were 
arrested for using perfume and throwing a paper airplane in school.132  
In New York, children have been arrested for writing on their desks 
with markers.133  In Connecticut, a student was arrested for allegedly 
stealing a beef patty from the cafeteria.134  The student’s brother was 
arrested when he asked officers why they were arresting (and using a 
Taser against) his brother.135 
States need not have a disturbing schools statute on the books to 
charge children for petty misbehavior.  When the DOJ investigated 
the Ferguson, Missouri Police Department, it interviewed an SRO 
who reported arresting students, mostly for “minor offenses—
Disorderly Conduct, Peace Disturbance, and Failure to Comply with 
instructions.”136  Other cases around the country involving a variety 
of charges for relatively minor misbehavior at school have been 
                                                                                                                                
 128. Id. at 1129. 
 129. Id. at 1129–30. 
 130. Id. at 1130. 
 131. G.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Casalduc, 982 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240 (D.N.M. 2013). 
 132. Chris McGreal, The US Schools with Their Own Police, THE GUARDIAN 
(Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/09/texas-police-schools 
[https://perma.cc/5SAT-JDD8].  Texas effectively repealed its disturbing schools 
statute in 2013. See infra notes 301–02 and accompanying text. 
 133. Stephanie Chen, Girl’s Arrest for Doodling Raises Concerns About Zero 
Tolerance, CNN (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/02/18/
new.york.doodle.arrest/index.html?hpt=C1 [https://perma.cc/XP4K-R6SY]. 
 134. Claire Michalewicz, Mom of Boy Tasered in High School Cafeteria Files 
Lawsuit, MIDDLETOWN PRESS (June 14, 2011), http://www.middletownpress.com/
general-news/20110614/mom-of-boy-tasered-in-high-school-cafeteria-files-lawsuit-
documents?viewmode=fullstory [https://perma.cc/QJ2N-7EHK]. 
 135. Id. 
 136. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 37 (2015) [hereinafter INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT], https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=95274 [https://perma.cc/
YQ4X-XARP]. 
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catalogued,137 including charges against young children with autism 
and other disabilities.138 
South Carolina is notable for having one of the broadest, if not the 
broadest, disturbing schools statutes in the nation.  South Carolina is 
the only state that criminalizes behavior which disturbs a school “in 
any way”—a phrase absent from other states’ otherwise similar 
statutes.139  Moreover, South Carolina’s broad language contrasts 
with limiting language in several other states’ statutes.140  For 
example, Arizona limits “interference with or disruption of an 
educational institution” to behavior involving threats of physical 
injury or threats of damage to any educational institution.141  
Nevada’s statute requires any disturbance to be created 
“maliciously.”142  New Hampshire limits its statute’s scope to “[a]ny 
person not a pupil,” thus excluding students who misbehave at their 
own school.143  Colorado only criminalizes disturbances “through the 
use of restraint, abduction, coercion, or intimidation or when force 
and violence are present or threatened.”144 
Importantly, South Carolina courts have declined to narrow the 
scope of the disturbing schools statute, in contrast with other state 
courts which have done so.  Westlaw reports only six South Carolina 
cases in which children appealed their convictions for disturbing 
schools, and every decision that ruled on the meaning of the statute 
affirmed the convictions.145  In the leading case, In re Amir X.S., the 
                                                                                                                                
 137. E.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, For More Teens, Arrests by Police 
Replace School Discipline, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/for-more-teens-arrests-by-police-replace-school-discipline-1413858602 
[https://perma.cc/YN2R-QNE6]. 
 138. See, e.g., Amanda Merkwae, Schooling the Police: Race, Disability, and the 
Conduct of School Resource Officers, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 147, 147–48 (2015) 
(describing three such cases). 
 139. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2010), with statutes cited supra note 
123. 
 140. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 871.01 (West 2006) (“Whoever willfully interrupts or 
disturbs any school . . . commits a misdemeanor . . . .”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 32210 
(West 2014) (willful disturbance); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-288.4(a)(6) (West 2013) 
(“[d]isrupts, disturbs or interferes with the teaching of students . . . .”). 
 141. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2911(A)(1) (2016). 
 142. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.910(3) (West 2015). 
 143. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:11 (2017). 
 144. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-109(2) (West 2017); see People ex rel. J.P.L., 
49 P.3d 1209, 1211–12 (Colo. App. 2002). 
 145. See generally In re Michael E., No. 2006-MO-043, 2006 WL 7353470 (S.C. 
2006); In re Mathew M., No. 2006-MO-044, 2006 WL 7353471 (S.C. 2006); In re Amir 
X.S., 371 S.C. 380 (2006); In re Joelle T., No. 2010-UP-547, 2010 WL 10088227 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 2010); In re John Doe, 318 S.C. 527, 535 (Ct. App. 1995).  The only case to 
reverse a conviction did so on procedural grounds. See In re Johnny Lee W., 371 S.C. 
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South Carolina Supreme Court rejected an argument that the statute 
was overbroad.146  It relied on the state’s strong interest “in 
maintaining the integrity of its education system.”147  The court stated 
that “[b]ecause the school environment is fragile by its 
nature, . . . [a]ny conduct in this context that interferes with the 
State’s legitimate objectives may be prohibited.”148  The Court 
conceded that a “fertile legal imagination can dream up conceivable 
ways” in which the disturbing schools statute might be applied to 
violate First Amendment rights, but such examples were not 
“substantial” enough to support a conclusion that the statute was 
overbroad.149  While a future case could challenge the statute on 
other grounds,150 the South Carolina Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
overbreadth challenge in Amir X.S. permits the disturbing schools 
statute to criminalize any behavior which disturbs a school, even 
slightly. 
In contrast to South Carolina, several other state courts have 
limited the scope of their disturbing schools statutes, specifically 
requiring a disturbance to be significant to qualify as a crime.  For 
example, Maryland courts have noted that various “[d]isruptions of 
one kind or another” are inevitable any time large groups of children 
come together.151  “[T]here is a level of disturbance that is simply part 
of the school activity, that is intended to be dealt with in the context 
of school administration, and that is necessarily outside the ambit of” 
the disturbing schools statute.152  For a school disturbance to amount 
to a crime in Maryland, it “must be one that significantly interferes 
with the orderly activities, administration, or classes at the school.”153  
Similarly, a New Mexico court interpreted a predecessor to its 
disturbing schools statute as requiring a “more substantial, more 
                                                                                                                                
217, 221 (2006), (reversing a conviction based on a conditional guilty plea because 
South Carolina law forbids such pleas). 
 146. In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. at 384, 389 (2006). 
 147. Id. at 390. 
 148. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). 
 149. Id. at 391. 
 150. In re Amir X.S. also involved a challenge to the statute as void for vagueness.  
The Court held that the child lacked standing to facially challenge the statute on this 
ground because “[t]here can be no doubt that Appellant’s conduct falls within the 
most narrow application of § 16-17-420.” Id. at 391.  A future case involving different 
conduct could challenge the statute as void for vagueness.  A federal lawsuit seeking 
to enjoin enforcement of the disturbing schools statute on students alleges that the 
statute is unconstitutionally vague. Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64, ¶ 106. 
 151. In re Jason W., 837 A.2d 168, 174 (Md. 2003). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 175 (emphasis added). 
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physical invasion” of a school environment.154  Florida courts have 
interpreted its disturbing school statute to only apply to behavior 
“specifically and intentionally designed to stop or temporarily 
impede” a “normal school function” and that the disruption must be 
“material[ ].”155  The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined 
criminal school disturbance to require a “substantial interference” 
even though the term “substantial” does not appear in the statute.156 
2. Disparities by Race, Sex, and Disability 
The Spring Valley incident, involving a White officer and two 
Black girls, immediately touched a nerve about disparities in policing 
generally and school-based arrests specifically.  Both state and federal 
prosecutors declined to charge the officer with any criminal offense, 
including any civil rights offense.157  Beyond that individual case, the 
large disparities in aggregate school arrests and charging decisions 
both in South Carolina and nationally present a strong case that race, 
sex, and disabilities have an impact on arrest decisions. 
South Carolina’s experience with its disturbing schools statute and 
other school-based arrests illustrates the particularly strong concerns 
about racial disparities that are present in school discipline, law 
enforcement referrals, and arrests across the country.  Black children 
make up 33% of all South Carolina children,158 and were defendants 
in 56% of all delinquency cases referred to South Carolina family 
                                                                                                                                
 154. State v. Silva, 525 P.2d 903, 907 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974).  How far this decision 
reaches was contested in A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1143–50 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting), the burping case discussed, supra notes 126–29 and 
accompanying text.  The child arrested for his disruptive burping and then-Judge 
Gorsuch argued that Silva provided clearly established law that the child’s conduct 
was not severe enough to justify the arrest.  The officer and school defendants 
argued, and the two-judge majority agreed, that Silva did not clearly apply to the 
newer disturbing schools statute nor clearly exclude the middle school burper’s 
conduct from the scope of the criminal law. See id. 
 155. J.J. v. State, 944 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
 156. In re Eller, 417 S.E.2d 479, 482 (N.C. 1992) (quotation and citation omitted). 
 157. See Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 26, at 11; Press Release, U.S. 
Att’y Office, Dist. of S.C., Federal Officials Close Investigation into Use of Force by 
School Resource Officer at Spring Valley, South Carolina, High School (Jan. 13, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sc/pr/federal-officials-close-investigation-use-
force-school-resource-officer-spring-valley [https://perma.cc/YR6L-EVJW]. 
 158. Children Under 18 Years of Age by Race/Ethnicity, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., 
KIDS COUNT DATA CTR. (2017), http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/6132-
children-under-18-years-of-age-by-race-ethnicity?loc=42&loct=2#detailed/2/any/true/
868,867,133,38,35/66,67,4262,3/12804,15653 [https://perma.cc/EU98-C7CG]. 
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courts in 2015–2016.159  The disparities are even greater in disturbing 
schools cases, in which Black children account for more than three 
quarters of all defendants.160  The South Carolina Department of 
Juvenile Justice published data from the 2008–2009 school year that 
showed that Black boys were charged with disturbing schools at 4.9 
times the rate of White boys, and Black girls were charged at 6.2 
times the rate of White girls.161  A more recent study of all school-
based arrests showed smaller, but still significant disproportionality in 
arrest rates of boys and girls—Black boys were arrested 2.68 times as 
frequently as White boys, and Black girls were arrested 2.95 times as 
frequently as White girls.162 
Similar disparities are evident nationally.  The U.S. Department of 
Education has reported that, nationally, Black children account for 
16% of all students, but 27% of students referred to law enforcement 
and 31% of school-related arrests.163  Earlier research has made clear 
that different rates of misbehavior cannot explain these disparities.164 
National measures suggest that, as in South Carolina,165 racial 
disparities among girls are larger than among boys.  Across the 
country, Black boys were suspended out of school 3.33 times more 
frequently than White boys,166 while Black girls were suspended out 
                                                                                                                                
 159. S.C. REPORT 2015–2016, supra note 121, at 11. 
 160. S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, DISTURBING SCHOOLS DATA FY 2008–2009, 
slide 3 [hereinafter DISTURBING SCHOOLS DATA FY 2008–2009], 
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/2010%20disturbing%20schools%20presentation_files/frame.
htm [https://perma.cc/WN7G-76HW].  The ACLU alleged similar figures continue in 
more recent years, with Black students “nearly 4 times as likely as their white 
classmates to be charged with Disturbing Schools.” Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, 
supra note 64, ¶ 76. 
 161. The S.C. DJJ reported that 14.2 of every 1000 Black boys were charged with 
disturbing schools, compared with 2.9 for White boys. DISTURBING SCHOOLS DATA 
FY 2008–2009, supra note 160, slide 5.  The rates were 9.3 for Black girls and 1.5 for 
White girls. Id.  
 162. HOLLY GROOVER, S.C. STAT. ANALYSIS CTR., STATISTICS FOR YEARS 2011–
2013 REGARDING DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY 
CONTACT (DMC) IN SOUTH CAROLINA JUVENILE ARRESTS FOR OFFENSES AT 
SCHOOL USING DATA FROM THE SOUTH CAROLINA INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING 
SYSTEM (SCIBRS), at 1, 12 (2016), http://www.scdps.gov/ohsjp/stats/Juveniles/
Juvenile_DMC_in_Schools_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4DD-WFLW]. 
 163. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA 
COLLECTION DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 6 (2014) [hereinafter OCR DATA 
SNAPSHOT], https://ocrdata.ed.gov/downloads/crdc-school-discipline-snapshot.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/65H6-ZZR4]. 
 164. See, e.g., Am. Psychological Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, Are Zero 
Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools? An Evidentiary Review and 
Recommendations, 63 AM. PSYCHOL. 852, 854 (2008). 
 165. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. 
 166. OCR DATA SNAPSHOT, supra note 163, at 12. 
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of school 6 times more frequently than White girls.167  Advocates 
have argued that “[g]ender and race intersect to create categories of 
girls who are especially vulnerable to certain system policies and 
practices,”168 leading Black girls to account for 43% of all girls subject 
to a school-related arrest.169  Advocates allege that these disparities 
“are often tied to racial and cultural biases or subjective expectations 
of what makes a ‘good’ girl,”170 and perceptions by both school and 
law enforcement officials that Black girls are less innocent and 
deserve harsher punishment than other girls exhibiting similar 
behavior.171  As a result, Black girls who engaged in behavior 
perceived as particularly loud or angry could be subject to 
unnecessarily harsh consequences.172  Commentators have used the 
arrests of the two girls in the Spring Valley High School incident to 
illustrate the phenomenon.173  Advocates recommend attacking this 
problem by “decriminaliz[ing] minor school-based offenses 
commonly charged to girls, such as verbally disruptive behavior.”174 
The intersection of race and disability is another essential factor.   
Nationally, children with a disability account for 12% of all students, 
but 25% of all children referred to law enforcement and 25% of all 
school-related arrests.175  Similar disproportionalities exist within 
South Carolina.176  Black children with disabilities encounter even 
                                                                                                                                
 167. Id. at 14. 
 168. FRANCINE T. SHERMAN & ANNIE BALCK, GENDER INJUSTICE: SYSTEM-LEVEL 
JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORMS FOR GIRLS 22 (2015), http://www.nationalcrittenton.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Gender_Injustice_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/562W-
BT67]. 
 169. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FUND, INC. & NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., 
UNLOCKING OPPORTUNITY FOR AFRICAN-AMERICAN GIRLS: A CALL TO ACTION FOR 
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 16 (2014), http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/
Unlocking%20Opportunity%20for%20African%20American%20Girls_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S8LR-BRA8]. 
 170. SHERMAN & BALCK, supra note 168, at 23. 
 171. Rebecca Epstein et al., Girlhood Interrupted: the Erasure of Black Girls’ 
Childhood, GEO. U. L. CTR., CTR. ON POVERTY & INEQ. 1 (2017), 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes/poverty-inequality/
upload/girlhood-interrupted.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6FW-UW3K].  Research also 
supports similar arguments regarding Black boys. Id. at 2. 
 172. Id. at 1. 
 173. E.g., RITCHIE, supra note 44, at 73. 
 174. SHERMAN & BALCK, supra note 168, at 39. 
 175. Id. at 7.  Children with a disability include, for purposes of this data point, 
children who have been deemed to have a disability under the Individuals with 
Disability Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1401 (2012). 
 176. JOINT CITIZENS & LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON CHILDREN, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 
27 (2017), http://www.sc.edu/jclcc/doc/2017_JCCLC_Annual_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UZA8-V6KS]. 
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more severe disparities: The UCLA Civil Rights Project calculated, 
for instance, that Black students on average are about 12% more 
likely to face suspension than White students, while Black students 
with disabilities are 15% more likely to be suspended than White 
students with disabilities.177  Using an earlier data set, the Civil Rights 
Project calculated that South Carolina’s school suspension rate for 
Black, White, and Hispanic children with disabilities all exceeded 
national averages, as did the gap between Black and White children 
with disabilities.178 
Perhaps the most powerful explanation for these wide disparities 
relates to implicit bias.  Research has shown that different behavior 
by different groups of students does not explain the disparities.179  
Sarah Redfield and Jason Nance have argued that implicit biases 
explain many of the large racial disparities in the school-to-prison 
pipeline.180 
Implicit biases are a particularly large concern in the application of 
broad criminal laws like disturbing schools.  An implicit bias “is an 
association or preference that is unconscious and experienced without 
awareness” and often (if not usually) conflicts with an individual’s 
beliefs.181  Forced to make a quick decision with limited information, 
an implicit bias may lead school officials or police officers to view the 
behavior of Black children (or Black girls or Black children with 
disabilities) as more disruptive or threatening than similar behavior 
by White children, and thus take more punitive actions against Black 
children.182  As the DOJ wrote in a statement of interest in Kenny v. 
                                                                                                                                
 177. Daniel J. Losen et al., Disturbing Inequities: Exploring the Relationship 
Between Racial Disparities in Special Education Identification and Discipline, 
UCLA C.R. PROJECT 1, 8 (2013), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/
projects/center-for-civil-rights-remedies/school-to-prison-folder/state-reports/
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 178. Daniel J. Losen, Discipline Policies, Successful Schools, and Racial Justice, 
UCLA C.R. PROJECT 1, 5 (2011), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-
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 179. See SARAH E. REDFIELD & JASON P. NANCE, AM. BAR ASS’N, SCHOOL-TO-
PRISON PIPELINE PRELIMINARY REPORT 1, 15–20 (2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/diversity_pipeline/stp_
preliminary_report_final.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/57JC-K9GV]. 
 180. Id. at 54–56.  Redfield and Nance have collected various studies which 
demonstrate how implicit biases affect a range of educational decisions and 
outcomes. Id. at 61–62. 
 181. Id. at 55. 
 182. See id. 61–62; see also id. at 58 (“Implicit bias is at play in discretionary 
situations and influences disciplinary and other youth related decisions.”). 
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Wilson, such broad statutes may “fail to provide sufficient guidance to 
police,” and “officers who lack clear guidelines regarding what 
conduct is criminal and when enforcement is appropriate may not 
apply the law equitably, whether or not the differences in 
enforcement are intentional.”183  Accordingly, it is recommended that 
the American Bar Association enacts “legislation eliminating 
criminalizing student misbehavior that does not endanger others.”184 
B. Legal Instruments’ Failure to Prevent Law Enforcement 
Involvement in School Discipline 
The Spring Valley incident also occurred because of other legal 
structures that put the SRO in a position to enforce the broad 
criminal law.  The SRO was not only stationed at the school, but he 
became a key feature of school discipline.  His role was not limited to 
protecting students from assailants with weapons, or even responding 
to situations which might reasonably be considered security risks, 
such as the suspected presence of illegal drugs.  Rather, the SRO was 
the person called by the school administrator to enforce the teacher’s 
and the administrator’s direction that the student leave the 
classroom.185  His role in the Spring Valley incident illustrates 
Catherine Kim’s conclusion that “schools increasingly rely on law 
enforcement to maintain order,” to the detriment of overall student 
outcomes.186 
Various authorities have argued for a much more limited role for 
SROs.   Noting the harms to students from school-based arrests and 
the racial disparities among such arrests, the U.S. Department of 
Education in 2014187 recommended that SROs’ role “focus[ ] on 
protecting the physical safety of the school or preventing the criminal 
conduct of persons other than students, while reducing inappropriate 
student referrals to law enforcement.”188  SROs, according to the U.S. 
                                                                                                                                
 183. Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64, at 12–13.  DOJ argued that other 
broad and vague criminal statutes had similar problems. Id. at 14–17. 
 184. REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 179, at 13. 
 185. See supra notes 51–57 and accompanying text (describing how the SRO was a 
step in a chain of progressive discipline). 
 186. Kim, supra note 41, at 864. 
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Department of Education, should be responsible for “addressing and 
preventing serious, real, and immediate threats to the physical safety 
of the school and its community,” but not have any involvement with 
“routine discipline matters.”189 
One leading recommendation for keeping SROs out of regular 
school discipline has been for school districts and law enforcement 
entities to enter into memoranda of agreement that clearly delineate 
what SROs will and will not do.190  This recommendation was 
followed by the local authorities at the time of the Spring Valley 
incident—a memorandum of agreement (“MOA”) was in place 
between the local school district and the sheriff’s department.191  But 
the MOA failed to stop the SRO from becoming involved in a school 
disciplinary matter and arresting and charging the two girls for 
disturbing schools, in part because it required school officials to 
inform SROs of any criminal conduct at school.192  The MOA’s 
failure illustrates an essential point: if districts are to permit SROs in 
their schools, it is important both that MOAs exist, and that their 
terms effectively keep SROs out of regular school discipline. 
The MOA in effect during the Spring Valley incident represents a 
middle spot between proposed memoranda, which do not provide 
much meaningful guidance, and those that significantly limit when 
schools can turn students over to SROs and when SROs can arrest or 
charge students.  Spring Valley High School’s MOA was based on a 
template designed by the DOJ program which funded many SROs 
around the country.193  The DOJ summarized a model memorandum 
in 2013 and recommended that memoranda of agreement list some 
examples of what SROs would do, but did not recommend any terms 
which would limit SROs’ role.194  The National Association of School 
                                                                                                                                
 189. Id. at 10. 
 190. See id. at 3, 10 (encouraging schools to “provide clear definitions of the 
officers’ roles and responsibilities on campus” and “document those expectations in a 
written agreement or memorandum of understanding”); see also NAT’L ASS’N OF 
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SHEET: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOR FY2013 SCHOOL-BASED 
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Resource Officers (“NASRO”) recommended sample memoranda 
which more actively blur the line between SRO duties and school 
discipline.  One such model states that SROs should “be an extension 
of the principal’s office” and should be involved in both “law 
enforcement matters and school code violations.”195  NASRO 
suggests a difference between law enforcement and school discipline, 
stating that SROs should bring students to the principal’s office for 
punishment for school discipline code violations.196  But involvement 
in school disciplinary incidents—even if theoretically limited to 
escorting students to the principal’s office—risks transforming school 
discipline matters into arrests or charges.  Such a concern is consistent 
with the empirical record, which shows that SRO presence at schools 
increases the likelihood of arrests, “even for low-level violations of 
school behavioral codes.”197  And the Association’s proposed 
memoranda impose no limits on when school officials can refer 
situations to SROs or when SROs may arrest or charge children for 
minor offenses.198 
In contrast, the Advancement Project (a civil rights advocacy 
organization) proposed a sample memorandum of understanding 
(“MOU”) that would only permit school officials to refer students to 
SROs if an incident created a risk of “imminent harm.”199  When 
SROs do get involved, the Advancement Project’s proposed MOU 
would prevent arrests or charges for minor offenses.  Fights, for 
                                                                                                                                
PARTNERSHIPS 2 (2013), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2013_MOU-FactSheet_v2_0916
13.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT5X-N8EK]. 
 195. NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RES. OFFICERS, SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER 
AGREEMENT 2 (2012), https://nasro.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/
MOUsampleA2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/CY7L-8F3E]. 
 196. Id. at 2–3.  The Association offers two other sample memoranda.  Although 
their language varies, the bottom line policies are consistent. NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. 
RES. OFFICERS, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE __ POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE __ 
SCHOOL DISTRICT FOR THE SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAM (2012), 
https://nasro.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MOUsampleC2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AWC3-9XGZ] (template memorandum of agreement); NAT’L 
ASS’N OF SCH. RES. OFFICERS, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING SCHOOL 
RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAM AT ___ SCHOOLS (2012), https://nasro.org/cms/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/MOUsampleB2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ2H-WXDP] 
(template memorandum of understanding). 
 197. REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 179, at 53. 
 198. See generally sample memoranda cited supra note 196. 
 199. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, PROPOSED MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN THE SCHOOL DISTRICT AND POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (2013), 
http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/cf357b9f96d8c55ff8_rdm6ib9js.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6Q35-UJ4B]; Fedders, supra note 41, at 571. 
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instance, could only trigger arrests or charges if they caused “serious 
bodily harm” or “necessitate[d] medical treatment.”200 
The Richland County MOA201 attempted, but largely failed, to 
limit SROs’ role—thus making it more like the federal and NASRO 
models than the model pushed by advocates like the Advancement 
Project.  The Richland County MOA’s failure thus illustrates 
weakness in the federal and NASRO models.  The MOA includes 
language reflecting the understanding that a line exists between law 
enforcement and school discipline.  “First and foremost the SROs will 
perform law enforcement duties in the school such as handling 
assaults, theft, burglary, bomb threats, weapons, and drug 
incidents.”202  Moreover, the Richland County MOA states that an 
“SRO shall not act as a school disciplinarian, as disciplining students 
is a school responsibility.”203  Despite those efforts to distinguish law 
enforcement from school discipline, the MOA’s very next sentence 
turns school disciplinary incidents into matters for law enforcement: 
“However, if the incident is a violation of the law, the principal shall 
contact the SRO or their supervisor in a timely manner and the SRO 
shall then determine whether law enforcement action is 
appropriate.”204  Thus, by contract, any time a student violates broad 
criminal laws—like disturbing schools, disorderly conduct, or breach 
of peace—school administrators must notify police.205  Any fight or 
petty theft—a student taking another’s cell phone, for instance—
would trigger law enforcement involvement, with no consideration of 
whether the school could or should properly handle such actions 
without law enforcement.206 
The Richland County MOA language was particularly important 
because no other source of law limited SROs’ role.  One statute 
defined SROs and clarified that they are empowered to arrest any 
                                                                                                                                
 200. Id. 
 201. The MOA is also notable for the financial cost imposed on the district.  In the 
year of the Spring Valley incident, the Richland County School District Two paid the 
Richland County Sheriff’s Department $690,992 for nineteen sheriff deputies to serve 
as SROs at fourteen separate schools (two each were assigned to high schools, 
including Spring Valley). Richland 2—RCSD 2015–16 MOA, supra note 96, at 1.  
The cost of SROs has been criticized for “tak[ing] away needed resources that could 
otherwise be used to hire more counselors, mental resources specialists, and 
implement the alternative programs” to arrests and school exclusions. Nance, Tools 
for Change, supra note 40, at 339. 
 202. Richland 2—RCSD 2015–16 MOA, supra note 96, at 2. 
 203. Id. at 3. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See id. 
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individual for “crimes in connection with a school activity or school-
sponsored event” anywhere in the state.207  But this statute offered no 
limitation for when SROs should exercise such authority.208  No law 
or regulation existed requiring a district to have an MOA, let alone 
governing what might be included in such an MOA.  Similarly, school 
district discipline policies did not limit the role of SROs, and, in fact, 
read as if law enforcement should provide disciplinary back-up to 
teachers.  The Richland County School District Two 2016–2017 
handbook noted that teachers can handle most discipline problems.209  
But “in cases where the student’s behavior affects the safety or 
learning opportunities of other students,” further action is authorized, 
including action in conjunction with local law enforcement 
agencies.210  Notably, behavior which might affect other students’ 
“learning opportunities” would involve a much wider range of 
conduct than criminal activity, let alone criminal activity that creates 
safety risks. 
One South Carolina statute even encouraged schools to report 
some incidents to law enforcement.  A statute enacted in 1994 
requires schools to: 
[C]ontact law enforcement authorities immediately upon notice that 
a person is engaging or has engaged in activities on school property 
or at a school-sanctioned or -sponsored activity which may result or 
results in injury or serious threat of injury to the person or to 
another person or his property as defined in local board policy.211 
The statute’s timing is notable.  It was enacted in an era when 
juvenile crime rates peaked, and when states widely enacted a range 
                                                                                                                                
 207. S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-12 (2013). 
 208. Id.  South Carolina statutes include only one limitation on the role of SROs—
SROs are exempted from a statute requiring police officers to investigate whether 
certain individuals are present lawfully in the country. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-
170(B)(6) (2011).  A federal court enjoined enforcement of the statute, so this 
limitation is moot. United States v. South Carolina, 906 F. Supp. 2d 463 (D.S.C. 2012) 
(enjoining enforcement), affirmed 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 209. RICHLAND SCH. DIST. TWO, 2016–2017 BACK-2-SCHOOL HANDBOOK, at 14 
(2016), https://www.richland2.org/RichlandDistrict/media/Richland-District/
Advanced/Standard%202/2.1/2-1-2016-2017-Richland-Two-Employee-Handbook.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FM9X-YTWS]. 
 210. Id.; see also RICHLAND SCH. DIST. TWO, STUDENT DISCIPLINE (2017), 
https://www.richland2.org/Departments/Administrative-Services/Student-Services/
Student-Discipline [https://perma.cc/YT4T-K2Z5] (providing that when “the 
student’s behavior affects the safety or learning opportunities of other students, 
additional disciplinary action must be taken”). 
 211. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-24-60 (1994). 
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of “tough-on-crime” juvenile justice reforms.212  This statute was not 
triggered by the student’s refusal to put away her cell phone in the 
Spring Valley incident—that behavior did not threaten, let alone 
cause, any injury.  But it would apply to a range of other common 
behavior, such as schoolyard fights or threats, which a school district 
could consider to fall under the statute.213 
As with South Carolina’s disturbing schools statute,214 the state’s 
statute requiring schools to report certain behaviors to law 
enforcement is among the broadest in the nation.215  The DOJ even 
held it up as a model of a strong reporting statute in 2002 (though the 
DOJ did not evaluate concerns that too much reporting might call law 
enforcement attention to situations that did not require it).216 
But South Carolina is not alone—other states have reporting laws, 
but their breadth varies, as Jason Nance has catalogued.217  Some 
require schools to inform police of any “violent, disruptive 
incidents”218 or any assault at school, even if it does not cause any 
injury.219  Other states require reporting, but in narrower 
circumstances, such as in cases of criminal bullying,220 
“intimidation,”221 or possession of controlled substances or 
weapons.222 
                                                                                                                                
 212. See, e.g., PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATE 
RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 1, 59 (1996), 
http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/statresp.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y3U-AASP] (describing wide-
ranging, tough-on-crime reforms); Barry Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile 
Court—Part II: Race and the “Crack Down” on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 
327–28 (1999) (arguing that increasing juvenile crime rates, racialized fear of crime, 
and decreasing faith in rehabilitation triggered “tough-on-crime” reforms). 
 213. See 2010 WL 2678697, at *2 (S.C.A.G. 2010) (offering attorney general’s 
opinion that “a school district is required to report all suspected crimes to law 
enforcement”). 
 214. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2010). 
 215. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 216. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS 
OF CRIME, REPORTING SCHOOL VIOLENCE 2–3, 5 (2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_
archives/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin2/welcome.html [https://perma.cc/6F5F-XKY9]. 
 217. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 40, at 
934–36. 
 218. ALA. CODE § 16-1-24(b) (2014). 
 219. See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279-3:1(A) (West 2014). 
 220. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d(b)(15) (2014). 
 221. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-84a.1 (2014). 
 222. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48902(c) (West 2013). 
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C. Diversion Programs Available Through Law Enforcement, Not 
School 
Authorities do not prosecute every child who an officer arrests or 
charges, and officers sometimes do not intend for children they arrest 
or charge to be prosecuted.  A large number are diverted.  That is, the 
child-defendant is offered the opportunity for charges against him or 
her to be dropped if he or she participates in a program designed to 
help the child understand his or her error, take steps to avoid 
repeating that error, and/or make amends with the victim.223 
One problem, however, is created when law enforcement agencies 
operate diversion programs and when there are insufficient school-
based diversion programs.  That scenario furthers the school-to-
prison pipeline by inducing officers to arrest and charge children who 
they do not wish to prosecute, and school officials to involve officers 
in disciplinary matters as a means of accessing diversion programs.  
Law enforcement diversion programs are good alternatives to 
prosecution, but not to school discipline. 
A challenge exists in the structure of such programs when, as in 
South Carolina, accessing them most easily occurs through police 
departments or prosecutors’ offices, rather than purely through 
schools.224  This practice furthers the school-to-prison pipeline both 
through the arrest or charge itself—which can label the child 
delinquent—and because sometimes such cases inadvertently lead to 
prosecutions.  The Spring Valley incident does not illustrate this 
issue—there is no public record suggesting that the SRO wanted 
either child he arrested to be diverted or that the solicitor considered 
it.  But the practice certainly exists in South Carolina. 
The practice is illustrated through a case handled by the author’s 
juvenile defense clinic which arose from a different high school in 
Columbia, South Carolina.225  A sixteen-year-old was accused of petit 
larceny for stealing cash from a guidance counselor’s desk.226  The 
boy was caught on video, confessed, and apologized to the guidance 
                                                                                                                                
 223. S.C. REPORT 2015–2016, supra note 121, at 5. (The South Carolina 
Department of Juvenile Justice, for instance, reports that thirty-five percent of all 
referrals to family court are diverted. Forty-five percent are prosecuted and the 
remainder are dismissed.). 
 224. See, e.g., APPENZELLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 12 (describing South 
Carolina’s “Youth Arbitration Program” as involving youth charged with crimes). 
 225. References to cases handled by the Author are protected by confidentiality 
laws.  For more information, see Redacted Petition (on file with the author). 
 226. In South Carolina, petit larceny covers theft of money or goods up to $2000. 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-30(A) (2012).  In the case described, the child was accused 
of stealing less than $400. 
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counselor.  He was also punished by the school with a long-term 
suspension requiring him to attend an alternative school for the 
remainder of the school year.  The guidance counselor and SRO 
agreed that the boy did not need to be charged or convicted.  They 
did want him to agree to pay back the money that was stolen, and 
knew that a diversion program operated by the sheriff’s department 
would require restitution payments.  So they charged him, and 
included with his charging documents a form recommending that he 
be permitted to participate in that program.  But that program 
refused to accept the child because he had previously completed 
(successfully) a diversion program for an earlier minor offense.  So 
the solicitor proceeded to prosecute the case.  After students working 
in the juvenile defense clinic got involved, the child offered to pay 
back the money and the guidance counselor wrote a statement asking 
the prosecutor to drop the charges, which she did. 
This case reveals the harms that can come from depending on law 
enforcement referrals for diversion programs.  Simply facing these 
charges, which included court appearances, increased this child’s 
likelihood of dropping out of high school fourfold.227  In addition, one 
wonders what would have happened to this child had his student 
attorneys not explored each avenue for a dismissal, and how many 
other children who lack such representation are prosecuted and 
convicted.228 
This process shows how the existing legal structure funneled a boy, 
who authorities did not even want to charge, into the legal system.  
All the victim of this crime wanted was restitution.  As the child’s 
guidance counselor, he determined that a diversion program, which 
would require restitution, was the most effective way to both hold the 
child accountable and help prevent him from committing other 
crimes.  Yet this teacher had no school-based diversion program to 
                                                                                                                                
 227. Sweeten, supra note 81, at 463. 
 228. Advocating for diversion options is an element of strong juvenile defense 
counsel. See ROBIN WALKER-STERLING ET AL., NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., 
ROLE OF JUVENILE DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DELINQUENCY COURT 22 (2009), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/youth_at_risk/SUPP2-NJDC-
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South Carolina noted that juvenile defenders could advocate to the solicitor to refer 
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do so. See MARY ANN SCALI ET AL., NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., SOUTH 
CAROLINA JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE: A REPORT ON ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND 
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 30 (2010), 
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[https://perma.cc/64NA-7LQA]. 
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turn to.  The only perceived option was turning the child’s mistake 
into a law enforcement matter. 
This example shows that access to such diversion programs is 
structured inadequately because it requires school officials and SROs 
to arrest and charge individuals.229  One of the most frequently used 
diversion programs in South Carolina—and the program in the case 
study above that the guidance counselor and SRO recommended—is 
an “arbitration” program, a form of victim-offender mediation 
informed by restorative justice principles.230  The program is designed 
“[to] bring[ ] together the juvenile offender, victim, and community 
directly or indirectly under the guidance of a trained volunteer to 
determine what actions the offender must take to restore and 
enhance justice.”231  This program is similar to a large number of 
restorative justice programs that exist around the country.232  In 
South Carolina, this program is operated by local prosecutors’ and 
sheriffs’ offices through a contract with the Department of Juvenile 
Justice (“DJJ”).233  DJJ guidelines define who is eligible and exclude 
any child who has a prior offense.234  That provision excluded the 
child in the case study.  These guidelines contain rather strict criteria, 
especially when compared to leading efforts in other jurisdictions to 
limit the school-to-prison pipeline by preventing charges for a list of 
misdemeanors unless it is the third offense in a single school year.235 
The South Carolina status quo also stands in contrast to a leading 
diversion structure in place in Clayton County, Georgia, outside 
Atlanta.  In place of arrests or charges (even those expected to lead to 
diversion programs), schools refer children directly to school-based 
programs.236  Similarly, the U.S. Department of Education in 2016 
                                                                                                                                
 229. As noted in the Introduction, a full exploration of various diversion programs 
that could be appropriate for minor school-based offenses which currently lead to 
delinquency charges is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 230. APPENZELLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 1. 
 231. Id. at 1, 11–13 (describing the program and similar programs nationally). 
 232. Id. at 11 (noting “many” similar programs). 
 233. Id. at 12. 
 234. Id. at 13 (noting eligibility is limited to first time offenders). 
 235. See, e.g., CLAYTON COUNTY SCHOOL PROTOCOL AGREEMENT 5, 
http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/Clayton%20Co.%20School%20Protocol%20Ag
reement%20(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH3A-YPVS] (“Misdemeanor type delinquent 
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complaint alleging delinquency unless the student has committed his or her third or 
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 236. Even a second offense in the same school year leads to a school-based 
diversion program. See id. at 6.  A third or subsequent offense in the same school 
year could lead to a court complaint. Id. at 5–6; see also Evie Blad, Atlanta Schools 
Start Over with Police, EDUC. WK. (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/ew/
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urged schools to develop more “corrective, non-punitive 
interventions, including restorative justice programs and mental 
health supports.”237  Such programs should “eliminate overreliance 
on SROs in schools.”238  In Denver, for instance, restorative justice 
programs have helped reduce school-based law enforcement referrals 
significantly.239  But such structures were not available or considered 
during the Spring Valley incident.  In South Carolina, an easy path to 
similar programs is through law enforcement referrals. 
D. Prosecutorial Discretion 
When SROs decide to charge children, the charges are funneled to 
juvenile court authorities, who must determine whether to prosecute, 
divert, or dismiss each case.  These intake decisions are important in 
their own right and may also affect school and SRO decisions whether 
to arrest or charge children in the first instance.240  These decisions 
are especially important when the criminal law has a particularly wide 
scope, giving authorities tremendous discretion to determine which 
school misbehavior will be prosecuted.241 
Juvenile court intake decisions have long been essential features of 
our juvenile justice system, and have distinguished that system from 
the criminal justice system for adults.242  A central principle is that 
juvenile court authorities should consider two factors when deciding 
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II.A.1–2 (describing how broad criminal laws create significant discretion which 
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 242. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 28. 
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whether to prosecute a child: first, whether they can prove a child has 
committed a crime and, second, whether prosecuting a child for such 
a crime is necessary to protect the public or to serve the juvenile 
justice system’s rehabilitative ends.243  As a result, juvenile courts 
should practice “judicious nonintervention.”244  The second factor, in 
practice, ought to screen out many school-to-prison pipeline cases 
from juvenile court dockets. 
Here too, the Spring Valley incident is instructive because of the 
unusually public statements about whether to press the disturbing 
schools charges, and the concerning absence of any consideration of 
that essential second factor in those statements.  The Richland 
County solicitor issued two public statements regarding the disturbing 
schools charges filed by the SRO against the two girls.245  Both 
statements emphasized whether evidence could prove the girls guilty 
of the crime.246  Neither statement discussed whether prosecuting the 
charges would help rehabilitate them or protect the public, or even 
noted such questions as an element of prosecutorial discretion.247 
One earlier South Carolina disturbing schools case illustrates a 
similar concern.  The case involved a ten-year-old elementary school 
student who hit a teacher’s aide.248  By his own admission, he then 
“proceeded to scream as loud as he could for one hour.”249  Then, 
while sitting in an administrative office, he said he tried to kill himself 
when a police officer walked in.250  The appellate record does not 
reveal why this child was prosecuted.  The bare facts reported on 
appeal make one wonder whether mental health interventions might 
have served this young child’s, and the public’s, interest more 
effectively than the juvenile justice system.  There is no provision in 
South Carolina law explicitly designed to ensure that authorities fully 
consider whether prosecution serves the purpose of the juvenile 
justice system.  Other scholarship proposes legal reforms to do so.251 
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III.  REFORM EFFORTS AFTER SPRING VALLEY AND WHY 
COMPREHENSIVE REFORM IS NEEDED 
Intensive reform efforts have been underway in South Carolina 
since the Spring Valley High incident.252  Legislators and litigators 
have targeted the disturbing schools statute.253  School districts and 
law enforcement agencies in Richland County have renegotiated 
memoranda of agreement regarding SROs.254  The South Carolina 
Department of Education has promulgated regulations which might 
limit the role of SROs to school discipline.255 
This Part will explore those reform efforts.  These efforts are 
positive256 and have the potential to limit school-to-prison pipeline 
arrests, charges, and prosecutions in South Carolina.  However, these 
efforts are also limited.  Efforts to narrow the disturbing schools 
statute are welcome—but may not stop authorities from charging 
children with other offenses, and levers other than legislative changes 
can lead to significant reductions in disturbing schools charges.257  
Efforts to renegotiate memoranda of agreement have yielded some 
improved memoranda, but still direct schools to refer all cases 
involving suspected crimes (no matter how minor) to law 
enforcement.258  State regulatory efforts are perhaps most promising 
in that they limit SRO involvement in school discipline incidents 
unless it is a more serious crime, creates an immediate safety risk, or 
represents the third such crime or more during a school year.259  Yet 
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even these regulations leave much discretion with school officials and 
SROs.260  And no significant efforts are underway to expand school-
based diversion programs or to ensure that charging decisions 
consider whether prosecuting children for school-based offenses 
serves the juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative mission.261 
A. Narrowing Criminal Law 
This section will analyze legislative and litigation efforts seeking to 
narrow significantly the scope of the disturbing schools statute.  It will 
also explain how South Carolina’s experience beyond the Spring 
Valley incident demonstrates that such efforts, while positive, will not 
fully address the problem of legal practices transforming school 
misbehavior into juvenile delinquency issues. 
1. Disturbing Schools Legislation and Kenny v. Wilson 
In 2017, the South Carolina Senate passed a bill which would 
dramatically narrow the scope of South Carolina’s disturbing schools 
statute.262  The South Carolina House of Representatives did not act 
on the bill before recessing for 2017, but may consider the bill when it 
reconvenes in 2018.263  The bill would mostly exempt students 
permitted to be at their school from the scope of the law.264  The only 
way a student could be guilty of disturbing his or her own school is if 
they threatened “to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon 
another.”265 
Advocacy for the 2017 bill includes one detail rich in historical 
irony.  The current version of the disturbing schools law was enacted 
                                                                                                                                
 260. See id. 
 261. See infra Section III.C.2. 
 262. S. 131, 122nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2017), 
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess122_2017-2018/bills/131.htm [https://perma.cc/RP9D-
T94M]. 
 263. The South Carolina General Assembly recessed for 2017 on May 11, 2017.  
The Joint Citizens and Legislative Committee on Children, which includes both 
legislators and relevant executive agency directors, also endorsed this bill. JOINT 
CITIZENS & LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON CHILDREN, supra note 176, at 28. 
 264. The bill would amend the disturbing schools law so that its main section would 
only apply to a “person who is not a student,” defined as someone “who is not 
enrolled in, or who is suspended or expelled from” the school at which any incident 
occurs. S. 131 § 1(B), 122nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2017), 
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess122_2017-2018/bills/131.htm [https://perma.cc/RP9D-
T94M].  
 265. Id. § 2. 
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in 1968 in response to civil rights protests in South Carolina.266  The 
law’s sponsor told the press, “I’m interested in keeping outside 
agitators off campus.”267  The sponsor of the 2017 bill to narrow the 
disturbing schools statute has used that historically resonant phrase to 
advocate for her bill.268  She has argued that her bill would “take our 
‘disturbing schools’ law back to its original intent, which is to protect 
our (in-school) students from outside agitators.”269  A phrase used in 
the 1960s to describe civil rights activists derisively is now used to 
support reforming the school-to-prison pipeline, a central goal of the 
contemporary civil rights movement. 
Where the pending bill seeks to stop charging students with 
disturbing schools, pending federal litigation seeks to enjoin 
enforcement of the statute against students.  The ACLU has sued the 
state of South Carolina claiming to represent a class of all South 
Carolina school children, with Niya Kenny as a named plaintiff, 
seeking an injunction against enforcement of both the disturbing 
schools and disorderly conduct statutes against them.270  The core 
                                                                                                                                
 266. S.C. Act 943, an Act to Amend Section 16-551, Code of Laws of South 
Carolina, 1962, Relating to Disturbances at Schools Attended by Women or Girls, so 
as to Include All Schools Within the Provisions of the Section, 1968 S.C. Stat. 2308.  
The original version of the bill, enacted in 1919, only applied to schools “attended by 
women or girls.” 1919 S.C. Acts 156, § 1, 1919 S.C. Stat. 239.  The 1968 amendment 
struck the language regarding women and girls, thus rendering the statute applicable 
to all students.  The Legislature gave final approval to the expansion on March 2, 
1968. 1968 S.C. Acts 943.  That approval came less than one month after the 
Orangeburg Massacre, in which South Carolina state troopers killed three unarmed 
black men protesting ongoing segregation in Orangeburg, South Carolina. Caitlin 
Byrd, To the Archives! Remembering the Orangeburg Massacre and Its Place in 
Civil Rights History, POST & COURIER (Feb. 9, 2017), 
http://www.postandcourier.com/news/to-the-archives-remembering-the-orangeburg-
massacre-and-its-place/article_a89cb158-ef06-11e6-849c-03ed94e98f57.html 
[https://perma.cc/HSP3-HNNU].  In yet another historical connection, Bakari Sellers, 
son of Cleveland Sellers, who helped lead to civil rights protests in Orangeburg in 
February 1968, now represents Niya Kenny in one of her civil suits. See id. 
(discussing Cleveland Sellers’ role and Bakari Sellers’ perspective on it); see also 
sources cited supra note 104. 
 267. Ripley, supra note 44, at 6. 
 268. See Mia McLeod, Why I’m Running, MIA MCLEOD FOR SENATE, 
http://miaforsenate.com/blog/why-im-running/ [https://perma.cc/KG4W-V8UF]. 
 269. Id. Local media has picked up the description as well, describing the bill as 
“aim[ing] to return the disturbing schools law to its original intent of protecting 
students and school staffers from ‘outside agitators.’” Cynthia Roldán, Legislators 
Debating Where ‘Obnoxious Adolescent Behavior’ Ends, Criminal Behavior Begins 
at SC Schools, THE STATE (Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.thestate.com/news/local/crime/
article137592723.html [https://perma.cc/4WEQ-LPQL]. 
 270. The named plaintiffs include Niya Kenny—the second girl arrested for 
disturbing schools in the Spring Valley incident—and several other individuals and 
organizations. See Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64. 
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issue is the same one litigated unsuccessfully on behalf of individual 
clients discussed in Section II.A—whether the disturbing schools 
statute is unconstitutionally vague.271  Kenny v. Wilson remains 
unresolved.272 
Notably, the ACLU litigation seeks relief that is broader than the 
pending bill—an injunction against enforcing both disturbing schools 
and disorderly conduct against students.273  This goal implies an 
important concern: stopping enforcement of the disturbing schools 
statute might prevent some of the more extreme examples of charges, 
but will not limit the school-to-prison pipeline as broadly as advocates 
hope.  The ACLU’s complaint notes how different charges can be 
interchangeable.274  For example, Kenny’s police report states that 
she was arrested for disorderly conduct, but she was charged with 
disturbing schools.275  Such a concern is entirely appropriate, as 
discussed below. 
2. South Carolina Experience Demonstrates that Narrowing the 
Criminal Law Is an Important but Insufficient Reform 
The proposed bill to limit the scope of the disturbing schools 
statute would likely prevent the most egregious prosecutions for 
which no other criminal law is applicable—such as those at issue in 
the Spring Valley High School incident.  But past experiences 
elsewhere in South Carolina demonstrate that authorities have used 
other charges in a large number of cases and thus perpetuated the 
school-to-prison pipeline.276  Those experiences contrast with the 
experience of Texas where broader reforms, including narrowing the 
criminal law, led to significant declines in school-based arrests.277  At 
a minimum, this contrast shows that the effect of narrowing the 
                                                                                                                                
 271. See Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64, at 1, 3; Motion For 
Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Law in Support at 17, 26, Kenny v. 
Wilson, No. 16 Civ. 2794 (D.S.C. filed Aug. 11, 2016) (arguing that both § 16-17-420 
and § 16-17-530 are vague). 
 272. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed 
the case, finding that plaintiffs’ fear of arrest or charges under the disturbing schools 
statute was insufficiently imminent to grant them standing to seek an injunction 
against its enforcement and making no ruling on the plaintiffs’ substantive legal 
claims. Id., Docket Number 90, Order, at 16–21.  The plaintiffs have appealed that 
ruling and the matter is pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit. Id., Docket No. 95, Notice of Appeal. 
 273. Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64, at 27. 
 274. See id. ¶ 17. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Infra notes 287–300 and accompanying text. 
 277. Infra notes 301–05 and accompanying text. 
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criminal law may vary significantly by jurisdiction.  At a maximum, it 
suggests that reforming disturbing school statutes or otherwise 
narrowing one portion of the criminal law without broader reforms 
will only have a modest impact.  Moreover, recent South Carolina 
data reveal a dramatic drop in disturbing schools charges without any 
statutory change—suggesting that factors other than the statute itself 
are particularly impactful.278 
The historic experience of Lexington County, South Carolina—a 
large suburban and rural county on the west side of the Congaree 
River across from Columbia—is particularly instructive.  In 2010, 
more than five years before the Spring Valley High School incident, 
the elected solicitor decided to limit disturbing schools 
prosecutions.279  In a letter to the local school superintendent, the 
solicitor noted his office’s “very long” dockets and schools’ ability to 
serve kids with behavior problems outside of the justice system.280  He 
said his office “will no longer prosecute a juvenile’s first two offenses 
of [d]isturbing [s]chools (DS) or [d]isorderly [c]onduct (DC).”281 
The solicitor’s announcement had the intended effect on disturbing 
schools charges—they plummeted.282  In four of the five preceding 
                                                                                                                                
 278. Infra notes 298–300 and accompanying text. 
 279. Letter from Donald V. Myers, Solicitor, to Dr. Karen Woodward, 
Superintendent (June 3, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Myers Letter]. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. See S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL COUNTY DATASHEET 
2015–2016 (2016) [hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2015–2016], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/
pdfs/2015-2016%20County%20Datasheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YZS-3YKN]; S.C. 
DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL COUNTY DATASHEET 2014–2015 (2015) 
[hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2014–2015], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2015-County-
Datasheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX3W-T6P8]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 
STATISTICAL COUNTY DATASHEET 2013–2014 (2014) [hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2013–
2014], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2014%20County%20Datasheets.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LR5F-U9XC]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL 
COUNTY DATASHEET 2012–2013 (2013) [hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2012–2013], 
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2012-13%20county%20datasheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Q5TQ-7RZR]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL COUNTY DATASHEET 
2011–2012 (2012) [hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2011–2012], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/
pdfs/2011%20county%20datasheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4EG-N2JH]; S.C. DEP’T OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL COUNTY DATASHEET 2010–2011 (2011) [hereinafter 
S.C. COUNTY 2010–2011], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/10-11%20County%20Data
sheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/KLP3-DJY9]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 
STATISTICAL COUNTY DATASHEET 2009–2010 (2010) [hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2009–
2010], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2010%20county%20datasheets.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q6E2-GQM7]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL 
COUNTY DATASHEET 2008–2009 (2009) [hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2008–2009], 
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2008-2009-County-Datasheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S
KJ-N28T]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL COUNTY DATASHEET 
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years, disturbing schools had been the single most frequent charge for 
children referred to the Lexington County Family Court, accounting 
for 98 to 161 cases in each of those preceding five years.283  After the 
letter was sent, the charge dropped out of the top five most frequent 
charges284 and has remained out of the top five ever since.285  Even if 
the charge was a close sixth place, it would account for no more than 
24 to 54 charges, depending on the year.286 
But Lexington County statistics suggest that this change had, at 
most, a small effect on the number of overall charges.  While 
disturbing schools charges declined, simple assault and battery287 
charges spiked.288  This suggests that authorities charged disturbing 
schools cases as something else.  Where there had been 88, 61, and 89 
simple assault charges in the three years preceding the solicitor’s 
announcement, there were 189, 126, and 140 charges in the three 
subsequent years.289  The three-year average increased by 91.2%.290  
That dramatic rise would be notable under any circumstances, and is 
particularly notable given the simultaneous decline in overall charges, 
and the shift away from using the disturbing schools charge. 
                                                                                                                                
2007–2008 (2008) [hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2007–2008], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/
pdfs/2008%20County%20Datasheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/29PX-M4M5]  
In Lexington County, there were 132 disturbing schools charges in 2005–06, 161 in 
2006–07, 115 in 2007–08, 98 in 2008–09, and 117 in 2009–10. See sources cited supra.  
Disturbing schools was the most frequent charge in Lexington County in each of 
those years except 2008–09, when it was the second most frequent charge. See 
sources cited supra.  The solicitor announced his policy change in June 2010. See 
Myers Letter, supra note 279. That is fortunate timing for statistical purposes because 
the fiscal year ends in June, so the new policy coincides with the change from the 
2009–10 reporting year to the 2010–11 reporting year.  For every year from 2010–11 
through 2014–15, disturbing schools is not on the list of top five most frequent 
referrals, and the fifth most frequent charge accounted for 32, 55, 47, 25, and 52 cases 
in each of those years, respectively. See S.C. COUNTY 2014–2015, supra; S.C. COUNTY 
2013–2014, supra; S.C. COUNTY 2012–2013, supra; S.C. COUNTY 2011–2012, supra; S.C. 
COUNTY 2010–2011, supra (noting collectively that only the top five charges are 
publicly reported). 
 283. See sources cited supra note 282. 
 284. See sources cited supra note 282.  
 285. See sources cited supra note 282.  
 286. See sources cited supra note 282.  
 287. The Department of Juvenile Justice reports the number of “simple assault and 
battery” charges per county. See sources cited supra note 282.  This charge is 
statutorily known as assault and battery in the third degree, a misdemeanor and the 
least severe form of criminal assault. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-600(E) (2015). 
 288. See sources cited supra note 282. 
 289. See sources cited supra note 282.  
 290. The average in the three years before the police change was 79 simple assault 
charges per year, compared with 152 in the three years which followed. See sources 
cited supra note 282.  
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The overall number of charges in the county did drop after the 
solicitor’s 2010 letter.291  However, that decline was part of a county- 
and state-wide trend of fewer family court referrals (which most likely 
largely follows reducing juvenile crime rates).  The average total 
referrals in Lexington County for the three years before the 2010 
letter were 19.7% higher than the average total referrals for the 
subsequent three years.292  But statewide, the total number of charges 
dropped even more—22.7%293—raising doubt that the Lexington 
County solicitor’s policy towards disturbing schools had much of an 
impact on the overall decline. 
Statewide trends also suggest that authorities have historically 
replaced disturbing schools with simple assault and battery charges.  
                                                                                                                                
 291. See sources cited supra note 282.  
 292. The S.C. county data sheets report 1011 charges in 2007–08, 1043 in 2008–09, 
and 1078 in 2009–10, for an average of 1044 per year. See sources cited supra note 282 
(showing those figures had been declining from figures above 1100 in 2005–06 and 
2006–07).  There were 888 charges in 2010–11, 821 in 2011–12, and 805 in 2012–13, for 
an average of 838 charges per year—a figure of 19.7% less than 1044. See sources 
cited supra note 282.  
 293. For statewide totals, see S.C. REPORT 2015–2016, supra note 121; S.C. DEP’T 
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2014–2015 (2015) [hereinafter 
S.C. REPORT 2014–2015], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2015-Annual-Statistical-
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CVN-WCPG]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2013–2014 (2014) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2013–
2014], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2014%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/56X9-QNEM]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL 
STATISTICAL REPORT 2012–2013 (2013) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2012–2013], 
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2012-13%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G2TF-6UTS]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL 
STATISTICAL REPORT 2011–2012 (2012) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2011–2012], 
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2011-12%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KCA9-L876]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL 
STATISTICAL REPORT 2010–2011 (2011) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2010–2011], 
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2010-11%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L8YW-Y959]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL 
STATISTICAL REPORT 2009–2010 (2010) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2009–2010], 
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2010%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MJ9W-UWSS]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL 
STATISTICAL REPORT 2008–2009 (2009) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2008–2009], 
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2008-09-Annual-Statistical-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8HV3-3L8Q]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL 
STATISTICAL REPORT 2007–2008 (2008) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2007–2008], 
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2008-Statistical-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UGX-
WF9A].  
There were 23,826 statewide charges in 2007–08, 23,111 in 2008–09, and 20,394 in 
2009–10, for an average of 22,444. See sources cited supra.  In the next three years, 
there were 18,114 in 2010–11, 17,180 in 2011–12, and 16,754 in 2012–13, for a three-
year average of 17,349. See sources cited supra.  That reflects a 22.7% decline. See 
sources cited supra. 
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After the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice studied 
disturbing schools charges (and the racial disparities within them) in 
the 2008–2009 fiscal year,294 the number of disturbing schools charges 
declined—from 2339 in 2008–2009 to 1780 in the following year and 
1067 in 2010–2011.295  As in Lexington County, when disturbing 
schools charges declined, simple assault and battery charges picked 
up much of the slack.  They spiked by nearly 900 in 2010–2011, and 
subsequently disturbing schools charges have crept back up while 
simple assault and battery charges have crept down in tandem.296  
Notably, as Figure 1 illustrates, the trend line for each charge appears 
to be a mirror image of the trend line for the other. 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between disturbing schools and simple 
assault and battery charges in South Carolina Family Courts.297 
 
The most likely explanation of these data is that when authorities 
charged children for disturbing schools less frequently, they started 
charging them for simple assault (and likely other charges) that could 
be applied to schoolyard fights and other misbehavior.  Fewer 
disturbing schools charges is still a good thing.  It would be difficult to 
frame the Spring Valley High School student’s refusal to put away her 
                                                                                                                                
 294. DISTURBING SCHOOLS DATA FY 2008–2009, supra note 160, at slide 5. 
 295. Id. 
 296. See infra Figure 1 and note 297. 
 297. For the source of the collected data presented in Figure 1, see S.C. REPORT 
2015–2016, supra note 121; S.C. REPORT 2014–2015, supra note 293; S.C. REPORT 
2013–2014, supra note 293; S.C. REPORT 2012–2013, supra note 293; S.C. REPORT 
2011–2012, supra note 293; S.C. REPORT 2010–2011, supra note 293; S.C. REPORT 
2009–2010, supra note 293; S.C. REPORT 2008–2009, supra note 293. 
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cell phone as simple assault, and thus similar conduct would not likely 
be charged if the disturbing schools statute is amended.  But the close 
relationship between disturbing schools and simple assault and 
battery charges should give some caution to advocates for narrowing 
the criminal law.  That step without others will probably reduce the 
number of children arrested and charged for misbehavior at school 
somewhat, but is unlikely to cause more dramatic change. 
South Carolina appears to be in the process of breaking this 
pattern—but the bottom line is that advocates should look beyond 
the scope of the criminal law.  The most recent year’s data reveals a 
50% decline in the number of disturbing schools charges—from 1324 
in 2015–2016 to 652 in 2016–2017.298  It appears that some disturbing 
schools cases are, consistent with prior practice, simply being charged 
as other crimes.  While overall charges decreased 12% and non-
violent charges decreased 14%,299 public disorderly conduct charges 
actually increased slightly—suggesting that some disturbing schools 
cases are being charged as disorderly conduct.300  Even so, the 
dramatic drop in disturbing schools charges significantly outweighs 
any such shift.  Notably, this dramatic decline happened without any 
statutory changes, as efforts to reform the disturbing schools statute 
remain pending.  Some other legal reforms or practice changes must 
therefore explain the reduction in disturbing schools charges.  This 
conclusion should not discourage efforts to reform the disturbing 
schools statute—it remains an overly broad and frequently used 
criminal law.  This conclusion should, however, focus efforts on other 
reforms beyond disturbing schools legislation as even more powerful 
means to limit the school-to-prison pipeline. 
Texas has an instructive and optimistic experience.  In 2013, Texas 
narrowed its version of disturbing schools—misdemeanor offenses of 
“disruption of class” and “disruption of [school] transportation”—so 
they do not apply to children attending their own school.301  A 
                                                                                                                                
 298. S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2016–2017, at 
13 (2017) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2016–2017], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2016-
17%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TA2E-FK28].  
 299. Id. at 11.  Total referrals decreased from 15,429 in 2015–2016 to 13,591 in 
2016–2017, or 11.9%. Id.  Nonviolent referrals decreased from 14,172 in 2015–2016 to 
12,194 in 2016–2017, a 14.0% decrease. Id.  
 300. Compare S.C. REPORT 2016–2017, supra note 298, at 13, with S.C. REPORT 
2015–2016, supra note 121, at 13.  That some disturbing schools cases could now be 
charged as disorderly conduct cases should not come as a surprise since the deputy in 
the Spring Valley incident initially charged Niya Kenny with disorderly conduct. See 
supra text accompanying note 67. 
 301. Act of Sept. 1, 2013, Tex. S.B. No. 1114, §§ 6–7 (2013), 
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/83R/billtext/pdf/SB01114F.pdf#navpanes=0 
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significant change promptly followed.  Citations issued to students fell 
by about fifty percent immediately, and reduced school-based arrests 
by one-third.302  But it is hard to attribute this decline entirely to that 
statutory change, because the legislature enacted other reforms at the 
same time—prohibiting officers from ticketing children at school and 
requiring them to complete complaints, including sworn statements 
by school officials about any disabilities the child may have and what 
“graduated sanctions” the school attempted.303  And even in Texas 
there was still a substitution effect, showing that the Texas reforms 
did not stop authorities from using arrests as a form of school 
discipline.  A 2016 review of Texas data found a greater reliance on 
disorderly conduct charges after the 2013 legislative change, 
“suggesting that Disorderly Conduct has replaced Disruption of Class 
and Transportation as a general catch-all offense.”304  Schoolyard 
fights, disorderly conduct, and similar charges continue to account for 
more than half of all school-based incidents which lead to court 
action.305 
Skepticism that narrowing the criminal law alone will dramatically 
reduce school-based arrests and charges is consistent with the 
experience of other states discussed in Section II.A.1.  Even when 
other states did not have disturbing schools statutes, authorities 
charged children for petty school misbehavior by labeling it 
something else—disorderly conduct or “failure to comply.”306  
Relabeling relatively less severe offenses has occurred in other 
juvenile justice contexts, and we should expect no different here.307 
                                                                                                                                
[https://perma.cc/AL6C-NE3B] (providing for the prosecution of certain 
misdemeanor offenses committed by children and to school district law enforcement) 
(amending TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 37.124 & 27.126). 
 302. TEX. APPLESEED & TEX. CARE FOR CHILDREN, DANGEROUS DISCIPLINE: HOW 
TEXAS SCHOOLS ARE RELYING ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, COURTS, AND JUVENILE 
PROBATION TO DISCIPLINE STUDENTS 11 (2016) [hereinafter TEXAS APPLESEED], 
http://stories.texasappleseed.org/dangerous-discipline [https://perma.cc/XWZ8-TK
AQ]. 
 303. Act of May 20, 2013, Tex. S.B. No. 393 § 12 http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/
tlodocs/83R/billtext/pdf/SB00393F.pdf#navpanes=0 [https://perma.cc/FZE3-DGN8] 
(regarding the criminal procedures related to children who commit certain Class C 
misdemeanors) (codified at TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.146). 
 304. TEXAS APPLESEED, supra note 302, at 11. 
 305. Id. at 5. 
 306. S.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 193, at 9. 
 307. See Barry C. Feld, Violent Girls or Relabeled Status Offenders? An 
Alternative Interpretation of the Data, 55 CRIME & DELINQ. 241, 242 (2009) (arguing 
that increasing arrests of girls for simple assaults, especially domestic assaults, were 
relabeled status offenses after statutes limited states’ ability to incarcerate status 
offenders). 
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This analysis should not dissuade advocates from working to repeal 
or narrow disturbing schools statutes, but rather, puts such efforts 
into context.  Compared with the status quo disturbing schools 
statute, it would be preferable to have no disturbing schools statute 
applicable at all or at least to have such a statute narrowed by 
statutory language or court decision, as several states have done.308  
But if either of these preferences were followed absent other changes, 
one should expect only a modest limitation on the school-to-prison 
pipeline, and for authorities to rely more frequently on charges other 
than disturbing schools.  How many school-based arrests and charges 
will occur will vary from state to state.  But even when large 
reductions are possible, narrowing the criminal law will leave plenty 
of incidents best handled at school within the boundaries of the 
criminal law.  Thus, narrowing efforts are helpful, but will not solve 
the entire school-to-prison pipeline problem. 
B. Governing the Role of SROs 
Nationally, some of the most prominent efforts to reform the 
school-to-prison pipeline have focused on the role of SROs.  
Ferguson, Missouri, represents a leading illustration.309  The DOJ’s 
2015 investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (triggered by 
protests surrounded the police shooting death of Michael Brown in 
2014) included findings criticizing Ferguson SROs for “treat[ing] 
routine discipline issues as criminal matters,” including frequently 
charging children with “[f]ailure to [c]omply, [r]esisting [a]rrest, and 
[p]eace [d]isturbance.”310  By the spring of 2016, the DOJ and 
Ferguson had entered into a consent decree which called for limiting 
SROs’ role.311  The consent decree requires “SRO Non-Involvement 
in School Discipline” and specifically directs school officials, rather 
than SROs, to handle “minor offenses committed by students, 
including, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, peace disturbance, 
loitering, trespass, profanity, dress code violations, and fighting not 
involving a weapon and not resulting in physical injury.”312  This 
provision recognizes that many incidents which fall within the 
                                                                                                                                
 308. Supra notes 151–56 and accompanying text. 
 309. Cf. INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 136 
and accompanying text (discussing charges filed by SROs). 
 310. INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 136, at 
37. 
 311. Consent Decree, United States v. City of Ferguson, 4:16-cv-00180-CDP, 48–52 
(2016). 
 312. Id. at 50. 
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boundaries of the criminal law are best framed as school disciplinary 
matters rather than law enforcement matters. 
But wider federal reform efforts have not adequately addressed the 
role of SROs.313  The federal involvement in Ferguson made it a 
unique case.  The DOJ and the U.S. Department of Education’s most 
recent guidance314 offers much more modest reforms.  As discussed 
above,315 model memoranda of agreements from the government and 
NASRO at the time of the Spring Valley incident did not impose 
limits on when schools could refer children to SROs or what SROs 
could do in those situations.  In September 2016, the Departments 
offered guidance calling for some improvements in managing SROs’ 
activities, but which would not fundamentally limit their role.  The 
Departments published a “Safe School-based Enforcement through 
Collaboration, Understanding, and Respect (“SECURe”) State and 
Local Policy Rubric.”316 The SECURe rubric called on districts and 
local law enforcement agencies to enter into memoranda of 
understanding, and to “involve[ ] . . . community stakeholders in the 
development of [memoranda of understanding],” citing state statutes 
and regulations requiring such involvement.317  Notably, neither the 
SECURe rubric nor the state laws it cited recommend or require 
memoranda of understanding to contain express limits on the actions 
of SROs such as those in the Ferguson consent decree.  To the extent 
the SECURe rubric says anything about SROs’ roles at school, it 
suggests that SROs should remain involved in petty criminal matters, 
such as disturbing schools, minor fights, and the like.  It encourages 
                                                                                                                                
 313. It is worth noting that some advocates have called for more dramatic reform 
“ending the regular presence of law enforcement in schools.” DIGNITY IN SCH., 
COUNSELORS NOT COPS: ENDING THE REGULAR PRESENCE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
IN SCHOOLS 2 (2016), http://www.dignityinschools.org/sites/default/files/DSC_
Counselors_Not_Cops_Recommendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JWL-U9C2].  While 
much can be said for such a call, I do not focus on it because it has not garnered much 
political traction nationally nor has it played a role in post-Spring Valley reform 
efforts in South Carolina.  For purposes of this Article, I focus on efforts to exclude 
SROs’ involvement from school disciplinary matters, and thus reduce the number of 
arrests and charges arising from such matters. 
 314. As noted, supra note 187, it remains to be seen whether the Trump 
Administration will revise this guidance. 
 315. Supra notes 199–205 and accompanying text. 
 316. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SAFE SCHOOL-BASED 
ENFORCEMENT THROUGH COLLABORATION, UNDERSTANDING, AND RESPECT 
(SECURE) STATE AND LOCAL POLICY RUBRIC [hereinafter SECURE RUBRIC], 
https://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/secure-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q
XN-PUK5]. 
 317. Id. at 2–4 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 162.215 (2016); 22 PA. CODE § 10.11 
(2012); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-6.2 (2014)). 
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memoranda of understanding to “[e]liminate the involvement of 
SROs in non-criminal matters,”318 suggesting ongoing involvement in 
criminal matters. 
The SECURe rubric also suggests that memoranda of 
understanding should “[e]ncourage officers to minimize arrests for 
minor school-based offenses.”319  This “encouragement” is welcome, 
but the verb choice illustrates the guidance’s weakness; minimizing 
arrests is encouraged, but fundamentally optional.  To its credit, the 
rubric does cite several sample memoranda of understanding with 
more specific limits. 320  For example, it cited a Broward County, 
Florida agreement providing that “[i]n any school year, the first 
instance of student misbehavior that rises to the level of a non-violent 
misdemeanor . . . should not result in arrest nor the filing of a criminal 
complaint.”321  Even this MOU, however, ensures that SROs have the 
discretion to arrest any child for any crime.322  Thus, model federal 
memoranda continue to eschew the recommendation of advocates 
like the Advancement Project, which propose memoranda that would 
limit when schools can refer children to SROs and when SROs can 
arrest or charge children.323 
The federal guidance also urges memoranda of understanding to 
require school districts and law enforcement agencies to “collect[ ], 
analyz[e], and report[ ]” data regarding SROs—how often they arrest 
or charge children, and the demographics (including race) of those 
children.324 
This section will describe efforts in South Carolina to limit the role 
of SROs—and, in particular, to keep SROs away from school 
discipline matters—both locally in the county where the Spring Valley 
incident occurred and statewide.  Locally, these efforts include a 
voluntary agreement with DOJ, which mandates limits on SROs’ 
roles and revising memoranda of agreement regarding SROs 
subsequent to the Spring Valley incident.  Statewide efforts include a 
2017 South Carolina Department of Education regulation limiting 
when schools may involve SROs.  The voluntary agreement with DOJ 
and the state regulations are the most promising reforms, and limit 
when schools can involve SROs more dramatically, while leaving 
                                                                                                                                
 318. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 9–13. 
 321. Id. at 10. 
 322. Id. at 11–12. 
 323. Supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
 324. SECURE RUBRIC, supra note 316, at 6. 
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much discretion with individual school districts.  The revised 
memoranda of agreement largely track the most recent federal 
guidance—they include some useful improvements but do not impose 
binding limits on SRO involvement. 
1. Local SRO Reforms in Richland County 
The most dramatic change in practice in South Carolina since the 
Spring Valley incident is evident in Richland County, where that 
incident occurred.  The Richland County Sheriff’s Department—the 
department that employed, and fired, the SRO involved in that 
incident—reports that it dramatically reduced arrests of children by 
SROs in the school year after the incident. 325  In the 2015–2016 
school year, it reported 268 such arrests, compared with only 123 in 
the 2016–2017 school year, a 54% decrease,326 with drug and weapon 
possession charges accounting for a majority of the remaining 
arrests.327  Richland County reforms led to particularly dramatic 
changes compared with statewide trends. From 2015–2016 to 2016–
2017, overall juvenile court referrals declined 11.9% statewide, and 
22% in Richland County.328  Disturbing schools charges fell 
particularly precipitously in Richland County—from 97 in 2014–
2015329 to 62 in 2015–2016,330 to so few that the state does not report 
county specific numbers in 2016–2017.331  
What legal reforms caused that decline?  Following the Spring 
Valley incident and the DOJ’s investigation of the Richland County 
Sheriff’s Department, the sheriff’s department took several steps to 
prevent SROs from becoming involved in regular school discipline.  
In particular, they agreed to several limits on SROs’ roles via a 
voluntary agreement with the DOJ—entered into between the two 
school years noted above—and negotiated new memoranda of 
agreement with all of its local school districts to take effect in the 
                                                                                                                                
 325. Deputy Chief Chris Cowan, The Richland County Sheriff’s Departments SRO 
Program: Innovation and Excitement for the 21st Century, slide 19 (2017) (on file 
with author). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Telephone Interview with Captain John Ewing, Richland County Sheriff’s 
Dep’t (June 26, 2017). 
 328. S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL COUNTY DATASHEET 2016–
2017, at 40 (2017) [hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2016–2017], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/
pdfs/2016-2017%20County%20Datasheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KFF-HPR3].  
 329. S.C. COUNTY 2014–2015, supra note 282, at 40.  
 330. S.C. COUNTY 2015–2016, supra note 282, at 40.  
 331. The state reports the five most frequent charges in each county.  Disturbing 
schools fell out of the top five in 2016–2017 for Richland County, meaning it was at 
least below 27 cases. S.C. COUNTY 2016–2017, supra note 328, at 40. 
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2017–2018 school year.332  Just as the consent decree in Ferguson, 
Missouri contains stronger terms than national guidelines for 
memoranda of agreement, the Richland County voluntary agreement 
contains stronger provisions than the revised memoranda and is the 
clearest legal cause of the decline in arrests.  That agreement, 
however, comes with a 2019 expiration date,333 thus underscoring the 
ongoing need for stronger terms in memoranda of agreement. 
a. Voluntary Agreement with the DOJ 
In August 2016, the Richland County Sheriff’s Department entered 
into a voluntary agreement with the DOJ, in which the DOJ ended its 
investigation into the sheriff’s department early and the department 
agreed to a range of steps to improve its performance.334  The 
voluntary agreement provides that SROs should not engage “in 
classroom management or school discipline matters that should be 
appropriately handled by school staff.”335  But, where the revised 
memoranda continue to require schools to report incidents to SROs, 
the voluntary agreement includes provisions to keep SROs out of 
such incidents.  The agreement, for instance, lists a range of offenses 
which “should typically be considered school discipline issues, and 
should be addressed by school personnel rather than SROs.”336  That 
list reads more like the Ferguson, Missouri consent decree than the 
DOJ-recommended memoranda of agreement.  It includes disorderly 
conduct, loitering, trespass, “fighting that does not involve a weapon 
or a physical injury that is more than de minimis,” and disturbing 
schools, unless there is a “serious, real, and immediate threat to the 
safety of the school and its community.”337 
Consistent with that agreement, the department has changed many 
of its internal practices with the explicit goal of learning from the 
Spring Valley incident.  In addition to significant training focused on 
                                                                                                                                
 332. 2017–18 Memoranda of Agreement with the Richland School District Two, 
Richland School District One and the Lexington-Richland School District Five 
[hereinafter 2017–18 Memoranda of Agreement] (on file with author).  The 
agreements are identical with the exception of the specific schools to which they 
apply and the amount of money each district pays the sheriff’s department in 
exchange for SRO services.  The sheriff’s department agreement with DOJ required 
it to review its memoranda of understanding with local school districts. DOJ 
COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER, supra note 101. 
 333. Reforms related to the selection, training, and supervision of SROs are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 334. DOJ COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER, supra note 101, ¶ 8, ¶¶ 74–75. 
 335. Id. ¶ 4. 
 336. Id. ¶ 55. 
 337. Id. ¶ 55. 
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alternatives to arrests and charges, and how traumas and mental 
health conditions affect children’s behavior, the captain who 
supervises all SROs employed by the department meets with each 
SRO after an arrest to discuss whether an arrest was necessary in that 
situation.338 
The agreement is only legally binding for three years,339 making 
ongoing legal instruments, like memoranda of agreement between the 
department and school districts, of particular importance. 
b. Renegotiated Memoranda of Agreement 
Local authorities also renegotiated memoranda of agreement 
between the Richland County Sheriff’s Department and local school 
districts.  These renegotiated memoranda of agreement expand the 
SRO program.  In the 2017–2018 school year, the Richland County 
School District Two will spend $230,000 more for SROs than it did at 
the time of the Spring Valley incident.340  The sheriff’s department 
will assign four additional SROs to the school district.341  Other 
provisions largely follow the 2016 federal guidance—they are a step 
forward from prior memoranda of agreement and discourage arrests 
of students, but continue to require school administrators to report 
any crime to SROs and leave individual SROs with the authority to 
determine whether to arrest any individual student. 
The revised Richland County memoranda have several elements 
that track the 2016 federal guidance.  They include several paragraphs 
that “strongly encourage” SROs to use alternatives to arrest for 
offenses such as disorderly conduct, trespassing, and loitering.342  And 
they require the sheriff’s department and SROs to track and make 
publicly available data regarding how frequently children are arrested 
or charged and the race (and other details) of children arrested or 
charged by SROs.343  The latter step was explicitly required in the 
sheriff’s department’s agreement with the DOJ following the DOJ’s 
investigation into its SROs.344 
Despite those additions, the key legal points in these new 
memoranda of agreement remain unchanged from the memoranda in 
place at the time of the Spring Valley incident, and thus are less 
                                                                                                                                
 338. Telephone Interview with Captain John Ewing, supra note 327. 
 339. DOJ COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER, supra note 101, ¶ 11. 
 340. 2017–18 Memoranda of Agreement, supra note 332, at 1. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). 
 343. See id. at 2. 
 344. DOJ COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER, supra note 101, ¶ 28, ¶ 45. 
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legally effective than the voluntary agreement in separating law 
enforcement from school discipline.  Where the voluntary agreement 
includes provisions to keep SROs out of incidents better handled by 
school staff, the revised memoranda continue to require schools to 
report incidents to SROs.345  The new memoranda emphasize in bold 
font the pre-existing language stating that SROs are not school 
disciplinarians but follow that language with the same troublesome 
provision requiring schools to report any criminal activity to the 
SRO.346  That provision threatens to turn SROs into disciplinarians, 
whether in bold text or not.  That risk is especially strong so long as 
disturbing schools remains a criminal charge in its current form.  One 
might argue that if the disturbing schools bill is enacted and that law 
can no longer apply to children properly at their own school, then this 
provision in the memoranda will result in fewer cases referred to 
SROs.  But the wide range of other charges which could substitute—
and have substituted—for disturbing schools suggest that this MOA 
provision will still require a wide range of behavior to be referred to 
SROs.  Moreover, this MOA language exceeds what the South 
Carolina reporting statute requires.  Under that law, schools must 
only report conduct that results in injury or a serious threat of injury, 
and gives school boards authority to define those terms,347 while the 
memoranda require the reporting of any crime.  Consistent with the 
memoranda of agreement maintaining troublesome language 
requiring schools to refer crimes to SROs, the relevant school district 
policy continues to permit law enforcement involvement not only 
when crime occurs, but in pure school discipline situations, when one 
child’s behavior affects another’s “learning opportunities.”348 
                                                                                                                                
 345. 2017–18 Memoranda of Agreement, supra note 332, at 3, ¶ 1. 
 346. The renegotiated MOA reads:  
The SRO shall not act as a school disciplinarian, as disciplining students is a 
school responsibility.  However, if the incident is a violation of the law, the 
Principal shall contact the SRO or their supervisor in a timely manner and 
the SRO shall then determine whether law enforcement action is 
appropriate.  
Id. at 1, ¶ 1 (emphasis in original).  This is the same precise language as was included 
in the prior MOA. See supra notes 202–03.  The only difference is that the new MOA 
places this language in a more prominent location and has bolded the first phrase. 
See also 2017–18 Memoranda of Agreement, supra note 332, at 6, ¶ 30. 
 347. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-24-60 (1994). 
 348. Supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
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The memoranda ensure that SROs have discretion whether to 
arrest or charge children for such incidents.349  This discretion 
illustrates a concern raised by Barbara Fedders—that even improved 
agreements can preserve police authority to determine when to arrest 
children, thus limiting the effect of reforms.350  That concern is 
particularly apt with the new memoranda because they are weaker 
than the model memoranda of agreement identified in the 2016 
federal guidance—while the latter make clear that a first time non-
violent misdemeanor should not lead to an arrest or charges,351 no 
such limitation exists in the Richland County memoranda. 
Jason Nance recommended that memoranda of agreement “specify 
that SROs will not become involved in routine disciplinary 
matters.”352  The MOA in effect for the Spring Valley incident and 
the subsequently revised memoranda indicate that it does not suffice 
to simply state that SROs should not engage in school discipline.  
Memoranda of agreement should clearly prohibit schools from 
referring children to SROs absent imminent safety risks,353 and 
prohibit SROs from arresting children for minor non-violent offenses 
unless the behavior is repeated and the school has tried other 
interventions. 
The revised memoranda’s continued requirement that schools 
report all crime to SROs creates a tension with the voluntary 
agreement.  Under the memoranda, school officials are contractually 
obligated to report misbehavior that amounts to minor crimes to 
SROs.354  But under the voluntary agreement, SROs should consider 
such behavior to be school discipline rather than law enforcement 
matters, and not get involved.355  An important reform would be to 
incorporate more of the voluntary agreement’s provisions into 
memoranda of agreement, especially once the voluntary agreement 
with the DOJ expires in 2019. 
                                                                                                                                
 349. 2017–18 Memoranda of Agreement, supra note 332, at 3 (“[T]he SRO shall 
then determine whether law enforcement action is appropriate. . . .  The discretion of 
filing formal charges is left solely up to the SRO.”). 
 350. Fedders, supra note 41, at 585. 
 351. Supra note 325, at slide 16. 
 352. Nance, Rethinking Law Enforcement Officers in Schools, supra note 87, at 
158. 
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 354. 2017–18 Memoranda of Agreement, supra note 332, at 3, ¶ 1. 
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2. South Carolina Department of Education Regulations 
The South Carolina Department of Education promulgated 
regulations which more effectively distinguish law enforcement from 
school discipline by limiting when schools may refer behavior to 
SROs.356  The regulations explicitly exempt certain conduct from the 
list of crimes that must trigger automatic law enforcement referrals—
disturbing schools, breach of peace, disorderly conduct, affray, and 
assault and battery which does not pose “a serious threat of injury or 
result[ ] in physical harm.”357  Schools may refer such less severe 
offenses to SROs “only when the conduct rises to a level of 
criminality, and the conduct presents an immediate safety risk to one 
or more people or it is the third or subsequent act which rises to a 
level of criminality in that school year.”358  This language is based on 
the Ferguson consent decree, which keeps SROs out of routine school 
disciplinary incidents,359 and a leading interagency agreement, which 
prevents arrests or prosecutions for a similar list of minor charges 
unless a student has committed at least three offenses in the school 
                                                                                                                                
 356. See 41(5) S.C. Reg. 57–65 (May 26, 2017), http://www.scstatehouse.gov/state_
register.php [https://perma.cc/WZK3-D7JY] (codified at S.C. Reg. 43-279 & 43-210).  
Although an examination of the drafting history of these regulations is beyond the 
scope of this Article, it is worth noting how various advocates’ efforts improved these 
regulations.  Shortly after the Spring Valley incident, the South Carolina Department 
of Education convened a Safe Schools Task Force, which recommended new 
regulation regarding SROs, and revisions to an existing regulation regarding school 
discipline codes. See S.C. DEP’T EDUC., SOUTH CAROLINA SAFE SCHOOLS 
TASKFORCE REPORT 5 (2016), http://ed.sc.gov/newsroom/public-information-
resources/south-carolina-safe-schools-taskforce-report/ [https://perma.cc/ZZ8G-XD
SQ].  Those proposed regulations would not have prevented the Spring Valley 
incident.  The SRO regulation would have required memoranda of agreement but did 
not require any specific limitations on the role of SROs. Id. at 17–18.  And the 
discipline regulation (like the MOA in effect for the Spring Valley incident) would 
have required schools to report any criminal conduct, no matter how minor, to law 
enforcement. Id. at 12 (proposed S.C. Reg. 43-279(IV)(B)(3)(d)).  Following critical 
comments from multiple advocates (including, in full disclosure, myself), the South 
Carolina Senate Education Committee returned the regulations to the Department, 
insisting that it revise them. Regulation Document Numbers 4657 & 4659 (reporting 
that “Committee Requested Withdrawal” and that the regulations were “Withdrawn 
and Resubmitted”), http://www.scstatehouse.gov/regnsrch.php [https://perma.cc/5K
SK-M74S].  The revisions included the limits on SRO contacts and law enforcement 
referrals discussed in this section. 
 357. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 43-279(IV)(C)(2)(a) & (3) (2017).  Exempting this list 
of offenses echoes provisions of the Richland County Sheriff’s Department’s 
voluntary agreement with the DOJ. See DOJ COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER, supra 
note 101, at 12–13, ¶ 55. 
 358. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS 43-279(IV)(B)(3)(d) & 43-210(IV)(A) (2017). 
 359. See supra notes 311–12 and accompanying text. 
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year at issue.360  Further regulatory limits on law enforcement 
referrals are not likely possible in South Carolina so long as the 
statute requires referrals whenever an action “may result or results in 
injury or serious threat of injury.”361 
The regulation requires law enforcement agencies and school 
districts to enter memoranda of agreement before placing SROs in 
schools, and those memoranda must include the regulatory limitations 
on SROs’ roles.362  This provision should require a re-evaluation of 
the terms criticized in Section III.B.1 that continue to require schools 
to refer all incidents that amount to a crime to SROs. 
These regulations are the furthest reaching statewide reform since 
the Spring Valley incident.  They explicitly prevent referrals to law 
enforcement for misdemeanor offenses—and do so more strongly 
than the revised Richland County memoranda of agreement.363  By 
limiting the number of cases that schools can refer to SROs, it avoids 
the concern that authorities can simply re-label disturbing schools as 
another offense.364  Quite simply, if law enforcement is not involved 
in a school discipline situation, then law enforcement cannot arrest or 
charge children in that situation. 
Nonetheless, even these revised regulations would still permit 
schools to inform SROs of any incident involving a petty crime that 
the school interprets to pose a safety threat of any kind.  The 
regulation leaves it to schools to define what conduct “presents an 
immediate safety risk” and to determine which such conduct they will 
refer to SROs.  The regulation also permits schools to determine 
when a simple assault “poses a serious threat of injury or results in 
physical harm” (and thus triggers an automatic law enforcement 
referral).365  Reporting a child to law enforcement for refusing to put 
a cell phone away, as in the Spring Valley incident, would likely have 
been prohibited.  But in common situations of school fights, any fight 
could be reasonably feared to pose a threat of injury to others and 
thus involve SROs.  The effect of this promising new regulation, 
therefore, will depend on how schools implement it. 
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C. Other Pillars of the Pipeline 
While Sections III.A and III.B summarize some impressive legal 
reform efforts, those efforts only address a portion of the laws that 
structure the school-to-prison pipeline.  Several key pieces of the 
pipeline’s legal architecture remain untouched by reform efforts. 
1. Reporting Statutes 
First, there has been no effort to narrow the statute requiring 
schools to report to law enforcement incidents posing a “serious 
threat of injury” to a person or property.366  Juvenile justice law is 
now evolving towards a less punitive and more rehabilitative model, 
which includes questioning tough-on-crime era reforms such as this 
reporting statute.367  But no bill challenging the reporting 
requirement has been introduced in the South Carolina legislature.  
Until that happens, many fights at school must, by law, be reported to 
law enforcement, even when a school-based disciplinary intervention 
is more appropriate.  The statute includes language permitting 
schools to define what level of injury or threat triggers this 
requirement.  At most, however, that language allows some school 
districts to narrow their reporting obligations under this statute.  
Naturally, only school districts that wish to narrow their obligations 
will do so.  As under the new state regulations, districts remain free to 
report a broad range of incidents to law enforcement. 
2. Absence of School-Based Diversion Programs 
Second, diversion programs have expanded—but they largely 
continue to operate through law enforcement rather than through 
schools.  In Richland County, law enforcement-based programs are 
growing pursuant to the Richland County Sheriff’s Department’s 
voluntary resolution agreement with the DOJ.  That agreement 
requires SROs to use the “least coercive measures” possible in 
response to students, including “restorative justice approaches.”368  In 
addition, the agreement requires that the sheriff’s department train 
                                                                                                                                
 366. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-24-60 (1994). 
 367. See Sayali Himanshu Bapat & Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Is There Justice 
for Juveniles in the United States, India, and Italy?: Towards a Framework for 
Transnational Comparisons, in THE FUTURE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: PROCEDURE AND 
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SROs in any school-based restorative justice or other diversion 
programs,369 and to maximize use of all available programs.370  On a 
statewide level, the revised state disciplinary regulations list 
restorative justice and other interventions as alternatives to more 
punitive interventions for student misconduct.371 
But neither the voluntary agreement nor the new state regulations 
actually create (or require districts to create) diversion programs 
operated through school systems.372  Such programs have grown 
slightly, but remain sparse.  The revised Richland County memoranda 
of agreement encourage SROs to access diversion programs, but note 
that they are operated through the Richland County Sheriff’s 
Department Youth Services Division.373  Small school-based 
restorative justice programs exist in a small number of local school 
districts in the state.  The Richland One School District has a pilot 
restorative justice program run with law student volunteers, but the 
program was so small as to not be included on the district’s website as 
of this writing.374  The Charleston School District announced plans to 
start restorative justice programs in three schools in the 2017–2018 
school year.375  These are hopeful but small steps and there has been 
no concerted effort as yet to develop such programs statewide.  Law 
enforcement involvement thus remains essential to accessing 
diversion programs. 
3. Prosecutorial Discretion 
Third, there has been no legal reform effort to reconsider how 
authorities determine which charges to prosecute and which to divert 
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or dismiss.  Consider what could happen even if reformers succeed in 
narrowing disturbing schools statutes and in limiting rules for when 
schools may refer incidents to SROs.  SROs will still be present in 
schools, and will still have the potential to arrest and charge students 
for misbehavior better dealt with at school.  SROs could encounter 
fights in the hallway, or school officials could report incidents to 
SROs (even in violation of the statute).  The school could even skip 
the SRO and file charges directly.376  How would individual children 
fight resulting charges?  Indeed, even if school officials reported the 
incident to an SRO in violation of the new state regulations, nothing 
in those revised regulations or existing MOAs provides individual 
children with a direct legal remedy.  Absent such a remedy, it is not 
difficult to imagine school districts violating the spirit, if not the letter 
of the regulation, and continuing to involve law enforcement in a 
range of student misbehavior.  And it is similarly easy to imagine law 
enforcement encountering incidents at school and arresting or filing 
charges against children. 
In such cases, the question then becomes whether authorities 
prosecute such charges and, if they do, how the child might fight 
them.  Limited data in South Carolina’s record suggests that agencies 
are more likely to consider whether prosecuting a particular child 
serves the system’s rehabilitative goals and thus dismiss a case.377  The 
ACLU’s examination of South Carolina data found that in twenty 
percent of cases in which the agency recommended diverting children 
accused of minor school-based offenses, elected prosecutors 
overruled those recommendations and prosecuted the children.378  An 
                                                                                                                                
 376. In South Carolina, anyone can file delinquency charges. See S.C. CODE 
ANN. 63-19-1020 (2008).  Although uncommon, several other statutes permit anyone 
to file delinquency cases. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-121(A) (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. 
10, § 1003 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260B.141(subd. 1) (West 1999) & 
260C.141(subd. 1) (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 169-B:6 (2014) & 169-C:7 (2017); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.27(A)(1) (West 2017); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6334(a) 
(2014); 14 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-11(b) (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-119 (1970).  
I have called for states to remove this authority, which is a relic of the early family 
court, in favor of juvenile justice authorities screening all such referrals to determine 
the strength of the evidence of a crime and whether prosecution is necessary to 
rehabilitate a child, an analysis that should include whether the incident is better 
handled at school.  Gupta-Kagan, supra note 28. 
 377. Cf. supra notes 246–49 and accompanying text. 
 378. Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64, ¶ 78 (“In about twenty percent of 
cases in which DJJ [Department of Juvenile Justice] recommended diversion, 
solicitor’s offices moved forward with prosecution.”).  An academic empirical study 
of this hypothesis is currently underway in South Carolina.  Several colleagues and I 
are surveying county practices to determine in which counties prosecutors make 
decisions without consulting the Department of Juvenile Justice and in which 
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agency model would lend itself to judicial review of decisions to 
prosecute cases, especially when the agency failed to seriously 
consider whether such prosecution served the child’s or the public’s 
interest.379  However, there has been no movement towards such a 
model, nor has there been any movement to change how prosecutors 
determine which charges to prosecute. 
CONCLUSION 
The Spring Valley incident of 2015 and South Carolina’s broader 
experience illustrate much about the school-to-prison pipeline’s legal 
architecture—both how the law permits the pipeline to operate and 
how legal reforms can address it.  The incident did not result from a 
single law or legal practice, but from several—the presence of broad 
criminal laws, the wide presence of SROs in schools, absence of 
effective limits on those officers’ roles, and prosecutorial discretion 
that does not adequately consider whether specific incidents warrant 
juvenile prosecutions.380  Even when the widely recommended step of 
establishing memoranda of agreements governing SROs is taken, it is 
insufficient when those memoranda do not impose meaningful limits 
on when schools can refer students to SROs or when SROs can arrest 
students.381  Finally, concentrating diversion programs in law 
enforcement and prosecution agencies helps lead cases to those 
agencies, including cases that could be better handled through 
programs operated at schools without the involvement of law 
enforcement.382 
Post-Spring Valley efforts to reform the law to limit the school-to-
prison pipeline have been heartening in multiple respects.  First, the 
existence of meaningful (however incomplete) reforms in a 
jurisdiction with a particularly active pipeline demonstrates that 
reform can happen anywhere.383  The dramatic statewide decline in 
disturbing schools charges should be celebrated.  Second, the 
transition of local officials involved in this incident—the sheriff and 
administrators of the affected school district—into advocates for legal 
reform is notable, and provided advocates with prominent support of 
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and whether varying procedures correlate with different outcomes. 
 379. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 28. 
 380. See supra Section I.A. 
 381. See supra Section III.B. 
 382. See supra Section II.C. 
 383. See supra Section II.D. 
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certain reform efforts.384  The decline in arrests by Richland County 
SROs is particularly dramatic,385 and suggests that the voluntary 
agreement terms which led to that decline should be incorporated 
through memoranda of agreement and elsewhere across the state. 
Those reforms, however, remain incomplete, and they illustrate 
several lessons for advocates in South Carolina and elsewhere.  First, 
while incremental reform may be necessary, advocates must be clear 
that success on one or two elements does not render the job complete.  
In particular, this Article has demonstrated how narrowing criminal 
statutes—while positive and important—will not stop authorities from 
arresting and charging children for relatively minor offenses at school 
in some states.386  Legislatures should narrow such statutes, but that is 
a first, not a last step. 
Second, statewide rules limiting schools’ ability to make law 
enforcement referrals are possible.  The most dramatic statewide 
reform in South Carolina thus far has been the state Department of 
Education’s new regulations limiting when schools can refer children 
to law enforcement.387  Prohibiting such referrals for minor offenses, 
absent repeat offenses or an imminent safety risk, is a dramatic 
development which could serve as a model for other state regulations 
or statutes.388  States, including South Carolina, should repeal statutes 
requiring schools to report broad sets of crimes to law enforcement, 
and states should consider enacting statutes or regulations like South 
Carolina’s prohibiting the reporting of minor crimes absent 
immediate safety risks or repeat offenses.389 
Third, stronger memoranda of agreement between schools and law 
enforcement agencies are essential.  An MOA simply stating that 
SROs do not engage in school discipline did not prevent the Spring 
Valley incident, especially when the MOA required schools to report 
all crimes to SROs.390  It is unlikely that more clearly encouraging 
SROs to avoid arrests will have a dramatic effect, especially when the 
MOA continues to require schools to report all crimes to SROs.391  
School districts and law enforcement agencies should reconsider such 
                                                                                                                                
 384. Both the Richland County sheriff and Richland County School District Two 
superintendent advocated narrowing the disturbing schools’ statute. See Roldán, 
supra note 255. 
 385. See supra Section III.B.1. 
 386. See supra Section III.A. 
 387. See supra Section III.B.2. 
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 390. See supra Section III.B. 
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terms, and include more explicit limitations on SROs’ roles such as 
those included in South Carolina’s new regulation and in the 
Richland County Sheriff’s Department’s voluntary agreement with 
DOJ.392 
Fourth, reformers should consider all the different authorities that 
may be able to influence relevant points of law.  Individual school 
districts develop discipline codes, establish (or do not establish) 
diversion programs within their schools, and negotiate memoranda of 
agreement with law enforcement agencies.393  Advocacy with those 
local entities, in addition to the statewide advocacy that has already 
occurred, is an important piece of the puzzle.394 
These steps, coupled with advocacy for reforms that are beyond the 
scope of this Article (such as improving teacher and SRO training, 
and developing positive school culture that does not depend on law 
enforcement), have great promise for preventing future Spring Valley 
incidents and for significantly narrowing the school-to-prison 
pipeline. 
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